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SPAM AFTER CAN-SPAM: HOW INCONSISTENT
THINKING HAS MADE A HASH OUT OF
UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAIL POLICY
Jeffrey D. Sullivan and Michael B. de Leeuwt
INTRODUCTION
The authors of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography And Marketing Act of 2003 (hereinafter, "CAN-SPAM"
or the "Act"),' the first United States federal law placing restrictions
on the use of unsolicited commercial e-mail ("UCE"), or "spam,"
were asking for trouble. First, the title of the Act rings of Orwellian
doublespeak. Second, its content has drawn ire from all sides except,
for the most part, the direct marketers who are the ones being
regulated - and that is not a good sign.
Despite the considerable fanfare that accompanied the Act's
passage, including high profile lawsuits by Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") against unnamed John Doe spammers,2 the reactions of both
anti-spam activists, and of spammers, to the new law suggest that the
Act has not had - and will not have - much effect in stemming the
rising tide of spain that is clogging e-mailboxes the world over.
Some of the apparent weaknesses of CAN-SPAM as an effective
tool to thwart spain arise from dubious drafting decisions, while
others reflect the endemic shortcomings of any attempts to control
spam by national legislation, given the inherent fluidity and
anonymity of e-mail distribution through the Internet. In addition,
long delay in enacting legislation - even flawed legislation - may
t Jeffrey D. Sullivan (jsullivan@bakerbotts.com) is an associate in the intellectual
property group of the New York office of Baker Botts, L.L.P. He received his law degree from
the University of Texas at Austin, where he was an associate editor of the Texas Law Review.
Michael B. de Leeuw (deleemi@ffhsj.com) is an associate in the litigation department of the
New York office of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. He received his law degree
from Rutgers University (Newark), where he was editor-in-chief of the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal.
I. Passed as Senate Bill S. 877, 108th Cong. (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-
7713, 18 U.S.C. § 1037).
2. See infra note 162.
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well be responsible in part for the enormous explosion of spain that
has made its control all the more difficult.
Spare is a serious problem on many fronts, but a more
sophisticated analysis of spare and its related phenomena, than that
performed by the authors of the Act, is necessary. Solving the spare
problem requires undertaking philosophical, historical, technological,
and economic analyses of the market forces that are at play. Only
after considering the dynamic interplay of these factors will it likely
prove possible to arrive at an effective solution to the spain problem.
I. THE ACT
Although Congress had been considering different anti-sparn
measures for many years,3 it was slow to pass a legislative response to
spain. 4 But in the face of an overwhelming public perception that
spam was proliferating at an unacceptable rate,5 recognizing that
spam was imposing massive cumulative costs on American business
and consumers,6 and noting the inconsistent, and often stringent, state
laws regulating spain, Congress finally acted in late 2003 to create a
national standard for the acceptable use of e-mail solicitations.7
The Act recited a compelling list of Congressional Findings.
Among these were:
3. Congress had been considering such measures since 1997. See infra notes 39-49.
4. The European Union, for instance, had finalized a Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications ("DPEC"), providing, among other things, regulation of e-mail
solicitations, by July 12, 2002. See DPEC, at http://www.dti.gov.uk/industries/
ecommunications/directive-on-privacyelectronic communications_200258ec.html.
5. See Enrique Salem, Can-Span Act is a Start, CNET NEWS (Dec. 11, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2010-1028-5119513.html (noting public dissatisfaction with span, then
estimated to make up as much as 67% of all e-mail traffic).
6. See, e.g., Jay Lyman, Spam Costs $20 Billion Each Year in Lost Productivity, E-
COMMERCE TIMES (Dec. 29, 2003), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/32478.html
(citing analysts' assertion that businesses' cost of dealing with spain were increasing at
approximately 100% each year).
7. The CAN-SPAM Act is drawn by its terms not to "spam," but to "multiple
commercial electronic mail messages" (with "multiple" being defined in specific numeric terms
of messages sent per day, week, or month), a category that would presumably include, but not
necessarily be limited to, UCE/spam. See S. 877, supra note 1 at § 4(d)(3). However, the Act
does expressly exempt from the definition of the class of regulated/proscribed communications
any "transactional or relationship messages," which are generally defined as communications
from a business to its pre-existing customers with respect to a prior business transaction or
ongoing business relationship. Messages from existing transaction partners have generally not
been viewed as "spain" per se (because affirmative consent to receipt of such messages is
inferred from the context of the prior transaction or ongoing business relationship). Id. § 3(17).
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(1) The rapid growth in the volume of UCE threatened the
convenience and efficiency of e-mail;
8
(2) UCEs accounted for more than half of all e-mail traffic; 9
(3) Most UCEs were fraudulent or deceptive;' 0
(4) UCE resulted in costs to recipients of UCE, including
the costs of storage and costs associated with the time
spent accessing, reviewing, and discarding the mail;"
(5) UCE was costly to ISPs, businesses, and educational
institutions because of the need to increase storage or
bandwidth or both;12
(6) The receipt of a large volume of UCE increased the
chances that wanted e-mail would be discarded or
ignored. 13
(7) Many states had enacted mutually-inconsistent versions
of anti-spam legislation that had not alleviated the spam
problem and were difficult to enforce. 14
CAN-SPAM attempted to address these identified problems in
two ways: (1) by requiring that all commercial e-mail promulgators
operate on an "opt out" basis, i.e., they must provide recipients of a
commercial message with a reliable means to elect not to receive any
future mailings from the particular sender; and (2) by restricting
certain common and deceptive practices employed by spammers, so
as to provide greater transparency and accountability for senders of
commercial e-mail.
The "opt out" provisions of CAN-SPAM are provided in Section
5(a) of the Act. These provisions make it a criminal offense to omit
from any commercial e-mail a functional means of unsubscribing
from future e-mails. All UCEs are to include advice to the recipient
making it clear that the e-mail is of a commercial nature and that the
recipient is entitled to opt out of future communications from the
sender. Senders are also required to provide within any unsolicited
commercial e-mail an accurate return postal address. 15
8. S. 877, supra note I at § 2(a)(2).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 2(a)(3).
12. Id. § 2(a)(6).
13. Id. § 2(a)(4).
14. S. 877, supra note I at § 2(a)(l 1).
15. Id. § 5(a)(5)(iii).
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The provisions aimed at stopping common deceptive spammer
tactics include prohibitions against: use of forged e-mail headers
and/or return addresses; 16 use of false or misleading subject lines;17
"harvesting" of e-mail addresses by automated means;' 8 hijacking of
intermediate "relay" computers to disguise the origin of commercial
e-mail;' 9 continuing to send commercial e-mails to, or distributing to
other spammers the e-mail addresses of, recipients who have opted
out; and20 use of multiple e-mail accounts for the purpose of
concealing spam activities. 2' Additional provisions of the Act place
further restrictions on sexually-oriented commercial e-mail.
22
The CAN-SPAM Act also requires the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), the agency generally charged with enforcement
of the Act,23 to formulate and present to Congress plans for
implementation of a "do not e-mail" list (modeled after the highly
popular "do not call" lists recently implemented in the U.S. to curb
telemarketing) by which consumers could globally opt out of all
UCE, and a plan for electronic submission to the FTC, and handling
of, consumer complaints regarding UCE 24
Violators of the CAN-SPAM Act could, based on the Act's
enforcement provisions, incur serious civil and criminal penalties. A
party who, for instance, was found to have forged e-mail headers, or
to have hijacked relay computers to distribute spam, could (if other
aggravating factors were found, such as that the spammer's activities
were employed in aid of a separate fraudulent scheme) face up to five
years imprisonment, in addition to fines and forfeitures. In addition
to initiating procedures under the specific provisions of the CAN-
SPAM Act, the FTC is empowered to seek remedies against violators
of the Act under its general consumer protection mandate and its
16. Id. §§ 4(a)(1), 3(8), 5(a)(1).
17. Id. § 5(a)(2).
18. Id. §§ 5(b)(1), 4(b).
19. Id. §§ 4(a)(1), 5(b)(1).
20. S. 877, supra note I at § 5(a)(4).
21. Id. §§ 4(a)(1), 5(b)(2).
22. Id. § 5(d) (requiring that any commercial e-mails regarding sexually-oriented
materials, unless sent pursuant to the recipient's prior consent to receive such material, be
clearly labeled as pertaining to adult subject matter and that the initially-viewable content of the
e-mail not contain the sexually-oriented content).
23. Id. §§ 7(a), 7(d).
24. Id. §§ 9, 10, 11, 14(e).
25. S. 877, supra note 1 at §§ 4(b)-(c).
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delegated powers to prevent deceptive trade practices by employing
the enforcement provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.26
The CAN-SPAM Act's prohibitions also extend to those who,
even without committing any violative conduct under the Act,
conspire to commit such conduct. The Act thus in principle invokes
the broad federal anti-conspiracy policies and remedies against even
attempted spain schemes." Finally, the Act provides that certain
especially-egregious spain activity (such as employing automated
address harvesting or "dictionary attacks" to generate lists of recipient
e-mail addresses, or employing proscribed spain activities in
connection with other crimes such as fraud or identity theft) can
justify imposition of enhanced penal sentences. Under the federal
sentencing guidelines, these enhanced penalties can apply either to the
unlawful spamming activity itself, or to another crime that the
perpetrator facilitated by such spamming.28
In addition to the basic, and in theory quite strong, enforcement
mechanisms entrusted to the FTC, the CAN-SPAM Act also
authorizes civil causes of action to be brought against violators of the
Act by: (a) state attorneys general or other agencies, who can, absent
FTC objection, seek injunctive relief, statutory damages up to
$2,000,000 (with the additional possibility of punitive damages in
special cases), and attorney's fees, for violations of the Act adversely
affecting their state's citizens; and (b) ISPs adversely affected by
violations of the Act, who can seek similar injunctive and statutory
damages remedies, up to a recovery of $1,000,000. Finally, the
prohibitions and penalties of the Act extend not just to the actual
sender of UCE, but also to any businesses retaining or working in
concert with such sender.29
II. THE SHORT (YET PERHAPS TOO LONG)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT
The first attempts to enact federal laws to curb spain date back to
1995 (long before the first Nigerian billionaire philanthropist had
earned his first naira). The first important anti-spam bill, the
Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, was
26. Id. §§ 7(a), 7(d).
27. Id. § 4(a).
28. Id. § 4(b).
29. Id. §6.
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introduced by Senators Murkowski and Torricelli in 1997.30 That bill
required that: (a) "Advertisement" or "ADV" appear as the first word
in the subject line of an e-mail;31 (b) all routing information be
accurate; 32 and (c) the UCE contain an opt-out provision. 33 The bill
also would have allowed for FTC enforcement,34 permitted actions to
be brought by the states 35 or by individuals, 36 refrained from pre-
empting state law,37 and created a limited "opt-in" system. The "opt-
in" system would allow customers to choose to receive UCE from
particular sources even if the UCE did not comply with the other
provisions of the Act, e.g., such an e-mail would not need to contain
"Advertisement" or "ADV" in the subject line.
The bill was fairly sophisticated, especially given the time when
it was written, which was a relatively spam-free era. Its most
important measure for controlling spam was the labeling requirement.
This would have allowed an ISP or end user to filter out automatically
e-mails that had "Advertisement" or "ADV" in the subject line.
While this measure would only have worked if spammers complied
with the law, given the relatively small volume of spain in 1997, it
might well have curtailed the exponential growth of UCE. It certainly
would have separated the legitimate, i.e., complying, spammers from
the illegitimate spammers, and effective enforcement might have even
been possible against the non-complying spammers. The bill,
however, was not acted on by Congress.
38
30. Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, S. 771, 105th Cong.
(1997), available at http://www.techlawjoumal.com/congress/slamspam/s771 is.htm.
31. Id. §3.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 7(a)(l).
34. Id. §4.
35. Id. §§ 5,9.
36. Id. § 8.
37. Id. §§ 5,9.
38. Another early congressional attempt to legislate spam was the Netizens Protection
Act of 1997, H.R. 1748, 105th Cong. (1997). This proposal would have amended the
Communications Act of 1934 to make it unlawful "to use any computer or other electronic
device to send an unsolicited advertisement to an electronic mail address of an individual with
whom such person lacks a preexisting and ongoing business or personal relationship, unless
such individual provides express invitation or permission."
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The original version of the CAN-SPAM Act 39 was introduced
along with nine other anti-spam bills during the 106th Congress
(1999-2000).4 0  The original bill included many of the features that
were ultimately passed into law, including the criminal sanctions, the
opt-out approach, and the general enforcement powers given to the
FTC.41 None of these early bills was signed into law, and, indeed,
none was even close to getting out of Congress until 2003 .42
There is little explanation for why Congress did not act for so
long while the problem of spam got steadily worse. While there was
considerable lobbying by direct marketing associations, the main
issues that concerned them were the use of "Advertisement" or
"ADV" labeling in headers, the possibility of an "opt-in" provision,
and the possibility of a private cause of action. Marketers were, of
course, vehemently opposed to such provisions. While there was
never a serious "opt-in" bill proposed in Congress, there were, as
noted, several bills that had labeling provisions. The direct marketers
strongly opposed labeling provisions publicly, citing First
Amendment reasons.4 3 Perhaps a more cogent reason for their
39. The first bill entitled "Can Spam" was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Congressman Gary Miller. See Can Spam Act, HR 2162, 106th Cong. (1999), available at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/cong106/spam/hr2l62ih.htm. Except for the name, however,
there is little connection between this act and the one that was passed in 2003. In 2000, Senators
Bums and Wyden, the authors of the ultimately enacted CAN-SPAM Act introduced the first
version of their bill, Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act
of 2000. S. 2542, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter "CAN SPAM 1"].
40. The others were: the Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. (1999); the
Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (1999); the Internet Growth
and Development Act, HR 1685, 106th Cong. (1999); the Internet Freedom Act, HR 1686,
106th Cong. (1999); the E-Mail User Protection Act, HR 1910, 106th Cong. (1999); the E-Mail
User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. (2000); the Netizens Protection Act of 1999, H.R.
3024, 106th Cong. (1999); the Protection Against Scams on Seniors Act of 1999, H.R. 612,
106th Cong. (1999); and the Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act, H.R. 5300, 106th Cong.
(2000). Links for all of these bills are available at:
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summ106.html#hr3113.
41. CAN SPAM 1. supra note 39.
42. Daniel Tynan, Antispam Legislation Lags, PC WORLD (Sept. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 112554,00.asp (noting that the 107th Congress had
considered eight anti-spam bills without acting on any of them).
43. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh and Robert Zarate, Spammers Slam Anti-Span
Proposals, WIRED, Mar. 28, 2002, available at http://www.wired.com/news/
politics/0,1283,51370,00.html?tw-wnstoryrelated (quoting the Direct Marketing
Association's President, Jerry Cerasale, as saying, "Going to the First Amendment issue, the
unsolicited commercial e-mail issue has been applied to non-profits trying to get funds. Courts
have ruled that's protected as speech.... We look at ADV as labeling speech and we oppose
that," and describing the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
as holding a similar view.).
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opposition was the ease with which an e-mail could be filtered and
discarded if it contained "ADV" in the header.
The 108th Congress ultimately passed the CAN-SPAM Act, but
not before introducing eight other bills.44 The striking thing about the
nine bills that were considered by the 108th Congress is how similar
they were. Other than the Criminal Spam Act of 200345 and the
Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act 46 (both of which were
specialized bills that dealt with only a particular technology), all of
the anti-spam measures had some sort of "opt out" provision or "'no
spam' registry" model for the control of spam.47 And only two bills,
the Stop Pornography and Abusive Marketing Act 48 and the Reduce
Spam Act of 2003, 49 had labeling requirements, requiring spammers
to identify spam with an "ADV" label in a header. No bills
introduced included "opt-in" measures, and no other radical measures
were thrown into the hopper such as, for example, a postage
requirement for e-mail advertisements.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the final version of the CAN-
SPAM Act, which was passed by the Senate on November 25, 2003,
agreed to by the House of Representatives on December 8, 2003, and
signed by the President on December 16, 2003, was very similar to
the first version of the bill, introduced in 1999. It was also very
similar to most of the other bills under consideration. This raises the
question, why was nothing done about spam while the volume of
spam spiraled out of control between 1997 and 2004?
Obviously, Congress and the nation had other important matters
to consider during this period, and the ever-increasing number of
"penis enlargement" e-mails was just an increasing nuisance for most.
However, it is interesting to question whether the long delay in
passing comprehensive legislation has itself contributed to
exponential increase in spam. It is possible that, had a comprehensive
44. They were: the Anti-Spam Act of 2003, H.R. 2515, 108th Cong. (2003); the Ban on
Deceptive Unsolicited Bulk Electronic Mail Act of 2003, S. 1052 (108th Cong. (2003); The
Computer Owners' Bill of Rights, S. 563, 108th Cong. (2003); the Criminal Spam Act of 2003,
S. 1293, 108th Cong. (2003); the Reduce Spain Act of 2003, H.R. 1933, 108th Cong. (2003); the
Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003, H.R. 2214, 108th Cong. (2003); the Stop
Pornography and Abusive Marketing Act, S. 1231, 108th Cong. (2003); and the Wireless
Telephone Spam Protection Act, H.R. 122, 108th Cong. (2003). See
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summI08.html#hr2515.
45. S. 1293, 108th Cong. (2003).
46. H.R. 122, 108th Cong. (2003).
47. See http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/suniml 08.html#hr2515.
48. S. 1231, 108th Cong. (2003).
49. H.R. 1933, 108th Cong. (2003).
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anti-spam law had been enacted in the late 1990s, even one with the
problems inherent in the CAN-SPAM Act, spam would never have
spiraled out of control. The lack of any federal law allowed
spammers to become increasingly rich and savvy. They were able to
analyze the approaches that Congress was considering, and in the case
of legitimate marketers, they had the time to influence (if not suborn)
the legislative process through lobbying.
III. ALL BARK, No BITE?
Based on the considerable fanfare that accompanied its passage
and its facially-impressive enforcement provisions, the CAN-SPAM
Act might be expected to provide hope to beleaguered spam recipients
and to engender fear (and compliance) on the part of bulk commercial
e-mailers. So far, however, neither of these outcomes has been
evident.50
Anti-spain activists and other commentators have, to the
contrary, blasted the CAN-SPAM Act as intrinsically flawed and
compromised from the start. Probably the biggest policy-based
complaints from the anti-spam camp are that the Act shifts the burden
of avoiding unsolicited e-mail, in the first instance, from the sender to
the receiver, by virtue of its "opt out" provisions.51 Vocal anti-spam
advocates have derisively dubbed the Act the "You-Can-Spam" Act,
arguing that it provides a federal imprimatur for unsolicited e-mail by
deeming it presumptively lawful as long as accurate return
address/header information, and functional "unsubscribe links" are
50. See, e.g., Lee Rainie and Deborah Fallows, The CAN-SPAM Act Has Not Helped
Most Email Users So Far: Disillusionment is Growing as 29% of Email Users Say They Are
Using Email Less Because of Spain, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Mar. 2004 ("March 2004
Pew Study"), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/
PIPDataMemo onSpam.pdf (describing Pew Internet survey that shows that CAN-SPAM
has been generally ineffective); Andy Sullivan & Eric Auchard, Progress in War Against Spain
Hit or Miss, Reuters (Apr. 11, 2004), at http://www.reuters.com/
newsArticle.jhtml?storylD=4798222 (quoting market researchers' estimates that "the worldwide
spam epidemic is expected to jump to 35 billion messages from 15 billion in 2003" and noting
that "most surveys show that volume has not dropped since the U.S. [CAN-SPAM] law took
effect in January.").
51. See, e.g., Spamhaus Position on CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (S. 877/H.R. 2214), at
http://www.spamhaus.org/position/CAN-SPAMAct_2003.htm ("Spamhaus sees the
introduction of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (S.877/HR 2214) as a serious failure of the United
States government to understand the Spam problem."). See also Grant Gross, CAN-SPAM Law:
Little Impact So Far, INFOWORLD (May 20, 2004), at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/05/20/HNcanspamimpactl .html.
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provided. 52  E-mail users are justifiably wary of unsubscribe links.
Such links have become fatally tainted because of spammers'
employment of bogus links, or worse, links that actually serve to
verify the recipient's e-mail address as a prime target for further
spam.53 Therefore, it is not clear that consumers will be willing to
rely upon purported unsubscribe links even when they are legitimate,
functional, and in compliance with CAN-SPAM. Critics also point
out that the Act pointedly refrains from providing any private right of
action to individual victims of spam. Instead, it vests all enforcement
authority in the hands of federal and state agencies and, to some
extent, ISPs.
54
52. See, e.g., United States set to Legalize Spamming on January 1, 2004, SPAMHAUS, at
http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso (providing commentary from leading anti-spam website
spamhaus.org):
Against the advice of all anti-spam organizations, the U.S. House of
Representatives has passed the CAN-SPAM Act, a bill backed overwhelmingly
by spammers and dubbed the "YOU-CAN-SPAM" Act because it legalizes
spanming instead of banning it. Spam King Alan Ralsky told reporters the
passage of the House bill "made my day." Spammers say they will now pour
money into installations of new spain servers to heavily ramp up their outgoing
spain volumes "all legally."
With the passage of CAN-SPAM, spamming will be officially legal throughout
the United States, CAN-SPAM says that 23 million U.S. businesses can all begin
spamming all U.S. email addresses as long as they give users a way to opt-out,
which users can do by following the instructions of each spammer. Anyone with
any sense would of course realize that if CAN-SPAM becomes law, opting out of
spammers lists will very likely become the main daytime activity for most U.S.
email users in 2004. The second main activity will be sorting through mailboxes
crammed with 'legal' spain every few minutes to see if there's any email
amongst the spam.
53. See, e.g., Hermit, National SPAM Law Not as Bad as Utah's, UTAH POLITICS (Dec.
16, 2003), at http://www.utahpolitics.org/archives/ooool9.shtml ("[C]ompetent computer
professionals will tell you to never hit unsubscribe, as it verifies your address.").
54. See, e.g., CAN-SPAM May Help Curtail Spam, but Bill Has Some Troubling
Provisions, CDT POLICY POST, Volume 9, Number 23 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_9.23.shtml ("[T]he CAN-SPAM Act lacks what might have
been the most effective means of enforcement - a narrowly drawn individual right of action.").
Laws restricting unsolicited commercial communications in other contexts have provided
private rights of action (cf 47 U.S.C. § 227, the "anti junk fax" law, permitting recipients of
unsolicited advertising facsimiles to seek damages of up to USD$1,500 in small claims court)
have been regarded as highly successful deterrents to abusive solicitations, by creating hundreds
of "private attorneys general" to pursue miscreants whose activities might otherwise escape
pursuit by the government's investigative apparatus. See Lori Enos, Can Spam Ever Be
Stopped?, E-COMMERCE TIMES (May 14, 2001), at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/9581.html (quoting expert to the effect that "most
fax spammers 'stopped pretty quickly' after the junk-fax law was passed" due in part to its
private right of action provision).
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Anti-spam activists further view with great suspicion the fact
that the CAN-SPAM Act enjoyed enthusiastic support from many
direct marketers and other users of UCE, who feared, but managed
through their lobbying to avert, more stringent and, as the activists
assert, more effective, legislation. s In particular, the direct marketers
were successful at ensuring that the federal law that was approved by
Congress and signed into law did not contain a labeling requirement
that would require all UCE to include "ADV" (or some variant) in
headers. Such a requirement would have made technological spam
solutions easier by allowing ISPs or end users to be able to filter
legally-compliant UCE with ease. Of course, this would have done
nothing to deal with the issue of illegitimate UCE, i.e., spam sent by
spammers who were not complying with the law.
Another factor that may add to the skepticism regarding the
efficacy of CAN-SPAM is that even the penalties that it does make
available are to be enforced in the first instance by the FTC, which
brings to the fray of spam fighting a slate largely clean of any
significant victories or effective action against spammers 6 For
instance, the FTC has long accepted consumers' e-mail submissions
of deceptive UCE. Rather than taking any action on individual
fraudulent spam communications, though, the FTC has simply
"archived" the spam in an impressively-comprehensive, but not
obviously useful, "museum of spam." 57  The FTC's chairman has
voiced his opposition to a "do not e-mail list" and expressed his belief
that "legislation cannot do much to solve the spam problem." Some
industry observers have voiced similarly-pessimistic views about the
true feasibility of enforcing compliance on rogue spammers who hide
55. See, e.g., David Berlind, Score one for the spammers: CAN SPAM bill to become
law, TECH UPDATE (Nov. 30, 2003), at http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/
Score one for the spammers.html ("It's no wonder the [Direct Marketing Alliance, a coalition
of bulk advertisers] likes the CAN SPAM bill. It gives marketers unbridled rights to invade our
inboxes at least once."); see also Joseph J. Lewczak and Ivana Starr, Congressional Cure-All
For Consumers' Clogged Inboxes: Federal Law Provides Uniform Set of Commercial Email
Rules, FINDLAW.COM, at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/ file/01009/009360
(providing summary of the Act by counsel for e-mail marketing companies: "The Act's impact
on state SPAM laws is a tremendous victory for the marketing industry.").
56. See, e.g., Stephen H. Wildstrom, Why Spammers Laugh at CAN-SPAM,
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
jan2004/tc2004017_2996_tc078.htm ("But neither the overburdened FTC nor hard-pressed U.S.
Attorneys get any new enforcement resources [to enforce the CAN-SPAM provisions].").
57. See Michelle Delio, FTC: Where Spam Goes to Die, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2002), available
at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,55972,00.htm (quoting FTC staff attorney: "No
one sits down and actually reads all the spain that we receive daily .... That would be incredibly
boring and totally futile.").
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behind the Internet's anonymity. Still, such sentiments appear in
dubious, defeatist taste coming from the head of the agency charged
with attempting to make such legislation effective. 8 The supine FTC
also has not shown itself especially imaginative in applying prior laws
to thwart spam - it has not, for instance, taken the aggressive, but not
unjustifiable, position that sending UCE with forged headers and
return/unsubscribe information is by itself (regardless of the UCE's
other content) an instance of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1843.' 9
IV. Is CAN-SPAM THE RUNT OF THE SPAM-FIGHTING LITTER?
Beyond its dubious pedigree, the Act suffers, in the eyes of
some, by comparison with enacted and proposed anti-spam legislation
or regulations from other jurisdictions, at least some of which were
viewed by anti-spam organizations as having considerably more
potential to cut down on spam. Many states had enacted laws that
dealt, or would have dealt, with spam in a number of effective ways.6 °
Other countries have also enacted UCE-related laws that span the
gamut of spam control approaches.
A. Alternate (And Now-Mooted) State Approaches
In all, 38 states enacted some form of law that reached spam and
spamming activities. The CAN-SPAM Act explicitly pre-empts most
state laws concerning UCE, including the far more stringent laws that
were already on the books in California and elsewhere. 61  At least
58. See FTC Chairman Calls Spam "One of the Most Daunting Consumer Protection
Problems FTC Has Ever Faced," FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/08/aspenspeech.htm#36237.
59. The elements of wire fraud under Section 1843 are: (1) that the defendant voluntarily
and intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money; (2) that
the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that
interstate wire communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire communications were
in fact used. In the UCE context, the FTC might have argued that that recipients of forged UCE,
who may spend thousands of dollars maintaining their e-mail servers and implementing spain
filters, are "defrauded" of this investment to the extent that they rely upon the spammer's false
representation that its message is a legitimate commercial communication, that unsubscribing
from the UCE is possible, and that the source of the e-mail is the (forged) returned address; in
essence, the spanmer is shifting the cost of transmitting and displaying his advertising from
himself to the receiving company's e-mail servers.
60. As noted, supra, these state laws are now pre-empted by the Act. An excellent source
for information regarding state and international span laws is Professor David Sorkin's
spamlaws.com website. It contains links to all enacted (and some un-enacted) span laws, both
domestic and international. See http://www.spamlaws.com.
61. See S. 877, supra note 1 at § 8(b); see also Joseph J. Lewczak and Alison
DeGregorio, California 's New SPAM Law Has Been Pre-empted by the Passage of the Federal
CAN SPAM Act of 22003, Which Goes into Effect on January 1, 2004, FINDLAW.COM, at
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some of these state laws contained (or, if allowed to come into force,
would have contained) proscriptions and penalties viewed by anti-
spain forces as more effective, and as properly placing more of the
burden of spain avoidance squarely on marketers, not e-mail
recipients.
1. Opt-In Approaches
California and Delaware were pioneers in anti-spain legislation.
Both adopted an "opt-in" approach to spain,62 making all UCE
unlawful unless the recipient had previously indicated consent to its
receipt.63 The "opt in" rule is in contrast to CAN-SPAM's "opt out"
provision, which makes at least the first unsolicited commercial e-
mail sent to a recipient lawful so long as he can affirmatively opt out
of future spain.
While the similarly-phrased Delaware "opt-in" law was a
criminal statute only, the California "opt-in" law also would have
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/01009/009210; but see Amit Asaravala, Taking
a Second Shot at Spammers, WIRED NEWS (Apr. 23, 2004), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,63181,00.html (noting that the Act expressly
reserves from pre-emption state laws regulating e-mail based upon the falsity or deception of its
contents, and noting efforts by California officials to re-pass legislation compliant with the safe
harbor); see also S. 877, supra note 1 at § 8(b)(l)-(2) (allowing for survival of state laws as
applied to e-mail to the extent that "any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached
thereto," as well as exempting from pre-emption "State laws that are not specific to electronic
mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort law; or... other State laws to the extent that
those laws relate to acts of fraud or computer crime.").
62. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (2003) (superseded) (rendering it illegal to,
inter alia, "(a) Initiate or advertise in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement from
California or advertise in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement sent from California
[or] (b) Initiate or advertise in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement to a California
electronic mail address, or advertise in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement sent to a
California electronic mail address," as well as to use common spammer techniques such as
"spoofing" (or forging) return address headers or falsifying subject lines (§ 17529.5) or
conducting automated address harvesting (§ 17529.4)); DEL. CODE TITLE 11 CRIMES AND CRIM.
PROC. § 937 (making it a criminal offense for a person to intentionally or recklessly send a UCE
unless there is prior consent or a prior business relationship between the parties).
63. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.1 (defining "unsolicited commercial e-mail
advertisement" as "a commercial e-mail advertisement sent to a recipient who meets both of the
following criteria:
(1) The recipient has not provided direct consent to receive advertisements from
the advertiser.
(2) The recipient does not have a preexisting or current business relationship, as
defined in subdivision (1), with the advertiser promoting the lease, sale, rental,
gift offer, or other disposition of any property, goods, services, or extension of
credit").
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provided a private right of action for spam recipients (unlike the
CAN-SPAM regime in which civil enforcement authority is left to
agencies and ISPs). The California law never went into effect as it
was pre-empted before it became effective.
2. Labeling Approaches
Sixteen states had enacted legislation that required all UCE to
include "ADV," "Advertisement" or a similar word in their e-mail
64 * bvheaders. As noted above, this approach was directly at odds with
the lobbying efforts of the legitimate direct marketers, who feared the
ease with which their messages could be filtered under such a regime.
Indeed, one of the likely reasons that the CAN-SPAM Act
finally passed through Congress in 2003 is that the direct marketers,
who in the absence of state laws would have presumably happily gone
unregulated, were concerned about the more stringent state
approaches, many of which (including California's very stringent
law) were enacted in 2003. CAN-SPAM provided a clear two-fold
victory for the direct marketers. It pre-empted more stringent state
laws while eschewing the approaches that direct marketers most
feared, i.e., the "opt-in" approach, the labeling approach, and the
private cause of action approach.65
B. Approaches In Other Countries
Critics have likewise argued that CAN-SPAM's relatively
marketer-friendly approach is at odds with anti-spam laws from other
countries, especially those adopted by the European Union. The
European Union finalized a Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications ("DPEC"), providing, among other things,
regulation of e-mail solicitations.66 The DPEC took an "opt in"
approach to most UCE. Countries such as the United Kingdom and
Italy have now, pursuant to the DPEC, put into force regulations
requiring prior opt-in before any commercial e-mail can be sent to an
individual consumer, although the regulations permit an "opt out"
64. These states were: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Texas. See SPAMLAWS.COM, at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html.
65. This is not to mention the idea of requiring an e-mail stamp for either advertisements
or for all e-mail, an idea that Bill Gates has recently discussed publicly. See John Hogan, Will
Gates' email Postage Idea Stamp Out Spain?, Feb. 6, 2004, available at
http://searchwin2000.techtarget.com/columnltem/0,294698,sidlgci949091,00.html. Obviously
such a provision, if enforceable, would disproportionately affect direct marketers.
66. DPEC, supra note 4.
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approach as to UCE sent to businesses. 67  While it is too early to
assess the efficacy of such laws, early results appear to be mixed.68
Other countries are adopting anti-spam legislation, but it is
difficult to tell the effect that these laws are having or will have. One
of the most facially impressive anti-spam laws is the new Australian
Spam Act 2003,69 which went into effect in April 2004. it is an "opt-
in" law that also imposes additional significant restrictions on
commercial e-mail that is lawfully sent.
C. Spam Litigation
In the pre-CAN-SPAM world, parties adversely affected by
spam often resorted to litigation to redress their harm, often relying on
common law doctrines such as trespass to chattels.70  Several ISPs
have received injunctive relief against spammers who have used their
systems.71  There are clear limitations to such actions, however,
including the need to demonstrate actual injury.72
More fundamentally, a recurrent problem with litigation as a
first-line remedy against spammers is that it is not easy to identify
most spammers. The UCE senders whom one is likely to be able to
identify with ease will most likely be the "legitimate" businesses
whose UCE contains valid unsubscribe links and undisguised return
addresses in its solicitations relating to legitimate goods and services.
However, such "legitimate" UCE does not provoke the wrath of
recipients, or pose all of the same problems, to the extent that
67. See DPEC, supra note 4; see also The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC
Directive) Regulations 2003, available at http://www.leamsteps4profit.com/antispamuk.html;
John Leyden, UK anti-spam law goes live, THE REGISTER (Dec. 10, 2003), at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/34443.html.
68. See, e.g., John Leyden, supra note 67 (reporting sampling in early January, 2004
showing that only three of 1,000 UCE samples contained the CAN-SPAM-mandated
information and links).
69. Spam Act, No. 129, 2003 (2003), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/
comact/I11/6735/rtf/1292003.rtf.
70. See generally David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited
Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325 (2001). Professor Sorkin also maintains an excellent
website that contains information and links to all things spain. See http://www.spamlaws.com/
71. See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Oh.
1997) (granting preliminary injunction in favor or an ISP against a spammer on a "trespass to
chattels" theory); Hotmail v. VanS Money Pie, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
1998) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of an ISP against a spammer on "trespass to
chattels" theory, for Violations of the Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and
for other deceptive acts).
72. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th (2003) (holding that Intel could not prevail on a
"trespass to chattels" theory when messages sent by a former Intel employee to current Intel
employees that disparaged Intel did not damage the computer system or impair its function).
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anonymous UCE, hawking bogus products and completely masking
its sender's identity, does.
V. EARLY FRUITS OF CAN-SPAM: LESS THAN PROMISING
That the CAN-SPAM Act falls well short of successfully
addressing the very problems that Congress correctly found were
caused by rampant spam can hardly be doubted. Spammers
themselves seem to have come to the conclusion that, Act or no Act,
they may with impunity continue with business as usual. Indeed,
early indications are that the vast majority of UCE continues not to
comply with the Act's requirements regarding opt out capabilities,
accurate signature and address information, and non-forged headers.73
By most accounts, the volume of spam has increased since the
effective date of the Act.74 Public irritation with spam appears to be
reaching new heights, and willingness to wade through spam to enjoy
the benefits of e-mail and the Internet may be sinking to new lows.
75
It is not even possible to say that the rate of increase of spam
incidence (let alone its overall prevalence) has substantially slowed,
given that most estimates for the overall proportion of e-mail that is
spam (now ranging in the 50%-80% area)76 were, as recently as only a
year ago, in the comparatively modest range below 50%.
77
73. See Leyden, supra note 67.
74. See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, CAN-SPAM Still Failing To Slow Junk Mail, TECHWEB
NEWS (Feb. 4, 2004) (noting that in the first month after the Act became effective, spam control
firms had observed either no drop-off, or an increase, in the percentage of incoming mail that
was made up by spam, with one filtering company reporting that an astonishing 79% of
processed e-mail was spam); Lee Rainey & Deborah Fallows, The impact of CAN-SPAM
legislation, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Mar. 2004), at
http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_DataMemo on Spam.pdf (reporting that a
greater proportion of e-mail users (24% and 19% of home and business e-mail users,
respectively) had observed net increases in incoming spain from January through March 2004
than had observed any diminution (only 20% and 11% of users, respectively)).
75. See Rainey & Fallows, supra note 50 (reporting that 77% of e-mail users reported
that spain made being online unpleasant and annoying, versus 70% expressing this sentiment in
a similar survey in Summer, 2003).
76. See, e.g., Press Release, Spam levels will peak at 80 percent of all Internet email,
BRIGHTMAIL (Feb. 10, 2004), at http://www.brightmail.com/pressreleases/021004_apac-80-
percent-spam.html ("[S]tatistics have shown spam levels hitting 60 percent of all email in
January 2004, up from just 40 percent a year ago."); Allen Wastler, Got more spam now?,
CNN.COM (Feb. 6, 2004), at http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/04/commentary/ wastler/wastler/
(citing incidence of spam as 60% of all e-mail ("a new high!") and arguing that CAN-SPAM
may have exacerbated spam problem worldwide by emboldening U.S.-based spanmers by
virtue of its opt-out provisions, as opposed to European-style opt-in provisions).
77. See, e.g., Press Release, Earthlink Provides Consumer Advice For Fighting Spam,
EARTHLINK (Apr. 29, 2003), at http://www.earthlink.net/about/press/prconsumerspamadvice/
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Although private parties, such as ISPs, have started bringing
civil litigation based on the CAN-SPAM Act,78 governmental
enforcement action has proceeded more slowly. The FTC has
brought only one criminal prosecution under CAN-SPAM to date,79
and no state attorney general appears to have initiated major criminal
or civil proceedings under the Act to date. The FTC continues to
conduct rulemaking proceedings to determine specific guidelines for
enforcing CAN-SPAM. The rulemaking proceedings for the
proposed do-not-e-mail list have been dominated by negative
comments from marketing companies who oppose as impractical any
limitations on their e-mail activities80 (a viewpoint in line with the
FTC chairman's expressed sentiments against a registry). Thus, the
odds of the rulemaking process leading to a hard-line implementation
of the Act seem chancy at best.
Federal sentencing guidelines for criminal violations of the Act
issued from the United States Sentencing Commission in April.
Commentators have characterized the provisions of the guidelines as
"stiff,'81 noting that they treat spain violations analogously to fraud
and theft.82  It remains to be seen how much zeal the agencies and
prosecutors charged with implementing such stiff penalties will show,
and whether they will be able to overcome the previously-prevalent
mindset expressed by one criminal defense lawyer incensed by the
("Reports indicate that spam accounts for more than 40 percent of all email traffic on the
internet,").
78. See infra Section VI(f).
79. See Ted Bridis, US. charges four under new law against spare, USA TODAY (Apr.
28, 2004), at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-04-28-spam-charges-filedx.htm
(detailing charges against four Detroit-based UCE promulgators whose millions of solicitations
had generated over ten thousand complaints to the FTC, and noting the indictment's assertion
that the accused spammers had engaged in classic spam techniques, such as hijacking relay
computers, to conceal the origin of their advertisements for dubious quasi-medical and personal
enhancement products).
80. Tim Lemke, Companies protest any do-not-span list, WASHINGTON TIMES (Apr. 12,
2004), available at http://washingtontimes.com/business/20040412-094511-7658r.htm ("Fifteen
of the 17 public comments made available to reporters by the FTC argue against the registry.
They include submissions from the Direct Marketing Association, Visa Inc., several e-mail
publishers and a host of local real estate associations.").
81. See, e.g., Paul Festa, Stiffspam penalties urged, CNET NEWS (Apr. 14, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5191651 .html.
82. See News Release, Sentencing Commission Toughens Requirements For Corporate
Compliance And Ethics Programs, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (Apr. 13, 2004),
at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0404.htm (noting that "[tihe Commission created a sentence
enhancement of approximately 25 percent if a defendant improperly obtains e-mail addresses for
the purpose of spamming and an automatic application of an additional 25 percent sentence
increase for mass marketing. Additional sentencing increases based on the amount of loss and
number of victims also will apply.").
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extent of the criminal penalties now theoretically available under the
Act: "'Congress made it a felony, but it's not the kind of misconduct
that causes what we typically consider as harm to victims,' said Jack
King, a representative for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers. 'The whole idea behind the federal sentencing
guidelines was to make the punishment fit the crime. But this is just
junk mail. This doesn't even kill trees.', 83 It is now up to the FTC
and the states' attorneys general to show that they do not share this
sanguine view.
To be fair, it is not completely clear that the inclusion of more
stringent anti-sparn terms in the CAN-SPAM Act, or more vigorous
action by the FTC and other oversight agencies, would by itself have
led to a substantial or immediate diminution in spam, as even
jurisdictions that have adopted strict "opt in" rules are not necessarily
going to see meaningful diminutions in the incidence of non-
compliant solicitation e-mails.
84
In fact, some have suggested that no legal approach can
successfully stop spam. Their pessimism is founded upon the multi-
jurisdiction problems of tracking and holding accountable anonymous
spammers operating through computers and relays in multiple remote
countries and the low barriers to entry allowing new spammers
readily to spring up and replace any other spammers who might be
identified and put out of business.85 On this view, the only parties
affected by or compliant with anti-spain legislation will be the good
and accountable corporate citizens who would be likely, even absent
such legislation, to honor their customers' preferences not to receive
solicitations.
On the other hand, given that some authorities assert that the
great majority of spain originates from just a handful of spain gangs,
83. Festa, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., John Leyden, UK anti-span law goes live, THE REGISTER (Dec. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/34443.html (quoting U.K.-based spain
expert: "Email users should not expect to see a huge impact on the volume of junk email they
receive [following implementation of the U.K.'s opt in rules for e-mails to consumers].");
Motez Bishara, New anti-spain laws fail to bite, CNN.cOM (Jan. 12, 2004), at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/intemet/01/12/spam.continues/index.html (quoting
compliance manager for Information Commissioner's Office, the body responsible for enforcing
U.K.'s partial-opt-in span regulation: "'We don't have the swift injunctive powers that we need
to act against those abusing the medium. A lot of people assume the law is stronger than it
is."').
85. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Why the New Federal "CAN Spam" Law Probably
Won't Work, FINDLAW.COM (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
ramasastry/20031203.html ("Ultimately, the real solution to spam, I believe, will be more likely
technological than legal, or some combination of these two, and potential other, approaches.").
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many based in the U.S. or other identifiable locations,86 it seems
inadvisable to despair entirely of a judicial and law enforcement
approach that could hope to put a significant dent in spam simply by
locking up or bankrupting the spam kingpins. At the same time, the
computer and e-mail industry will be pursuing more and more potent
technological measures (such as Bayesian filtering and
"challenge/response" authentication systems8 7 for e-mail) to intercept,
and reduce the value to the sender of engaging in, abusive UCE.
VI. WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT THE UCE PROBLEM AND ITS
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Some of the difficulty in coming to grips with UCE may arise
from the significantly different approaches that various observers and
participants in the spam wars - even those clearly on the same general
side in the spammer vs. anti-spammer arms race - take to some of the
fundamental questions regarding UCE. The answers to these question
vary based upon each analyst's view of what purpose the Internet and
e-mail serve (or ought to serve), why (or even if) UCE abuse is a
problem, who is to blame for that problem, and what solutions to this
problem are both feasible and acceptable from a policy perspective.
88
Indeed, these divergent different analyses make it difficult even to
define "spam." Such differing perspectives also inform the various
86. John Leyden, US Anti-Spam Laws "Will Legalise Spam, " THE REGISTER (Jan. 7,
2003), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/31506.html (citing Spamhaus
contention that "around 200 individuals, most of whom are US-based, are responsible for around
90 percent of world's spai messages (or at least nine in 10 of those who can be traced,
anyway). Several are based in Boca Raton, Florida, which has earned the unenviable reputation
at the world's spam capitol."); News Release, War On Spam: EU Calls For International
Cooperation, EUROPEAN UNION (Feb. 3, 2004), at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/
2004/20040012.htm (asserting that "[s]pam accounts for more than 50% of EU e-mail traffic,
80% of which is in English and 80% of which claims to originate in North America according to
December 2003 figures.").
87. Such authentication regimes would require (before an e-mail was delivered) that the
sender personally respond to a challenge automatically generated by the receiving party's server,
with the required response being of a type impossible for automatic-mailing software to
generate. Similar approaches would involve requiring a sender's name and return address to
appear on a "white list" of senders trusted by the recipient, or implementing improved tracking
and analysis of e-mail headers to detect the "true" originating address even when the header has
been forged or 'spoofed.'
88. Cf generally Philip Bobbit, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) at 25-28, 9-24, 39-58,
74-92, 93-119 (laying out six "modalities," or approaches to interpretation, through which
disparate scholars have approached constitutional analysis (textual, historical, structural,
doctrinal, prudential, and ethical), and suggesting that the conclusions drawn as to proper or
desirable interpretation of constitutional meaning and policy may be influenced considerably by
the specific mode of analysis applied).
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approaches to making a significant dent in spam through legislative
initiatives, regulation, litigation, or technological solutions. Below
we set forth a few exemplary (and somewhat-simplistically
characterized) "modalities" of thought that seem to have animated the
perceptions and conclusions of various observers and participants in
the spam wars as to what spam is, and what - if anything - can and
should be done about it.
A. "Information Wants To Be Free"8 9
The Internet has long had a reputation as a haven for
individualists and experimenters.9" Many Internet pioneers and
experts have been vociferous in their opposition to most forms of
governmental incursion into the realm of electronic communication or
commerce. Some reach this anti-regulatory standpoint from either a
libertarian or classical liberal economic viewpoint, 9 1 and some from a
more left-leaning concern with freedom of speech and
communication.92  It thus perhaps comes as no surprise that many
proponents of a minimally-regulated Internet have not lined up behind
any governmental approach to UCE control.9 3 Indeed, some have
89. See Roger Clarke, "Information wants to be free...", (Aug. 28, 2001), at
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/lIIl/WtbF.html (attributing the phrase's genesis to
author Stewart Brand, ca. 1984); but see Cecil Adams, Recent Columns, The Straight Dope, at
http://web.archive.org/web/19961230204507/http://www.straightdope.com/ (suggesting a
limitation on the usefulness of this rallying cry as a practical policy tool: "Before you start
penning missives complaining that there is only a year of [the author's] columns available and
that 'information wants to be free,' please remember that this information actually wants to one
day be bundled up and sold for $9.95 at a store near you.").
90. See, e.g., Erik Jay, Tales from the Internet: Part 1, Weapons of Misinstruction, Enter
Stage Right (Mar. 27, 2000), at http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/
0400intemetpl.htm (noting that demographic data supported the perception of comparatively-
early Internet users as disproportionately "libertarians, independents, and individualists," but
cautioning against over-simplistic political characterizations of Internet enthusiasts).
91. See, e.g., Paul Kapustka, Anti-Tax Group Calls For Moratorium On VoIP Regulation,
INTERNETWEEK.COM (Apr. 7, 2004), at http://www.internetweek.com/breakingNews/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=18900527 ("[T]he National Taxpayers Union is asking for 'an
explicit policy of forbearance of taxation and regulation on Internet telephony,' to better ensure
that the growth of the nascent technology isn't hampered by taxes or regulations.").
92. See, e.g., Chilling Effects ofAnti-Terrorism: "National Security" Toll on Freedom of
Expression, Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/
Terrorism militias/antiterrorism chill.html (criticizing federal efforts to regulate access to
controversial Internet content in the name of national security and law enforcement, and
speaking in support even of right-leaning website freerepublic.com in its federal copyright
dispute with publishers whose articles freerepublic.com reproduced in connection with political
commentary).
93. See, e.g., the Electronic Frontier Foundation's Spain (Junk E-Mail UBE) Archive, at
http://www.eff.org/Spam cybersquattingabuse/Spam/; Marvin J. Johnson, A.C.L. U. Interested
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looked with skepticism on any broad treatment of UCE as a problem
to be quashed, believing that such approaches may suppress the
presumptively-favorable maximization of information exchange and
threaten to legitimize other governmental intrusions on personal and
economic liberty.94 Some, indeed, wax elegiac about the liberating
democratic potential of completely unregulated e-mail.95 The ability
to send anonymous, untraceable e-mails, using such spammer-
beloved tactics as return address spoofing or anonymous "remailers"
has even been specifically touted as a signal benefit of the electronic
age (because of its potential, in non-commercial settings, to embolden
legitimate criticism, complaint, and the identification of wrongdoing,
as for instance an employee's revelations to the SEC of corporate
misconduct by his superiors).96
Persons Memo: Analysis of S. 630, Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act of 2001 or the CAN SPAM Act of 2001 (May 15, 2002), at
http://www.aclu.org/FreeSpeech/FreeSpeech.cfm?ID= 10361 &c=84 (critiquing an earlier
version of the Act).
94. See, e.g., Steven Cousineau, Libertarian Approaches to Addressing Spam, THE
LIBERTARIAN ENTERPRISE (June 24, 2002), at http://www.webleyweb.com/tle/libe179-
20020624-09.html (rejecting a suggestion for regulating spai by imposing a taxing firewall to
exact a de minimis (per message) charge on each outgoing Internet communications (which
would arguably not significantly affect "legitimate" e-mail users but would pose a crushing
burden to spammers sending millions of messages): "[T]he power to tax is the power to destroy.
The only other government based alternative is laws that will probably be both ignored and
ignorant. I still get a pile of spain and so far twenty (20) states have laws addressing spam
Laws on the Internet to date have only worked where all of the participants agree on the
necessity of following the law.").
95. See, e.g., John "Birdman" Bryant, A Libertarian Defense of Spare, at
http://www.thebirdman.org/Index/Lbtn/Lbtn-Spam.html:
Let's put it this way: Spam is the key to freedom on the Net. Spam is the free
exchange of ideas - the modem town square - the new Liberty Tree of the
American nation, and indeed, of the entire world.... Spam is how people get
connected, and thus spam is how these connections will develop into the great
convolution-filled cerebrum of Gaia.
The bottom line, then, is that spam is not the problem. Rather, the problem is the
controlled market in which it occurs, and the eagerness of Big Ugly Government
types to use the 'issue' of spam to get their greasy regulatory fingers around the
throat of the greatest boon to freedom in the history of the world.
96. See, e.g., Andre Bacard, Anonymous Remailer F.A.Q., Nov. 15, 2003, at
http://www.andrebacard.com/remail.html:
Why would YOU use remailers? Maybe you're a computer engineer who wants
to express opinions about computer products, opinions that your employer might
hold against you. Possibly you live in a community that is violently intolerant of
your social, political, or religious views.... Perchance you're a whistle blower
afraid of retaliation. Conceivably you feel that, if you criticize your government,
Big Brother will monitor you.... In short, there are many legitimate reasons
why you, a law abiding person, might use pro-privacy email systems.
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It is perhaps fitting that the ideological rallying cries of the "free
information" approach to Internet and e-mail regulation (in which
freedom of access and exchange is viewed as a near-paramount
good), once enunciated by serious theorists of differing political
stripes, flowed with nearly friction-free rapidity into the minds and
hands of UCE purveyors. It may be true that the Cato Institute or
ACLU membership status of some spammers is subject to doubt, and
that their respective acquaintance with the heights of von Mises'
economic theory, or the other philosophical elevations reached in
libertarian warnings against "Big Ugly Government," would prove
somewhat limited. But UCE purveyors, legitimate and otherwise,
have bowed to no man in their enthusiastic embrace of "free
information"-based analyses of policy issues concerning regulation of
e-mail.97
97. See Stefanie Olsen, Judge ties antispammer's hands, CNET NEWS (May 11, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1024_3-5210518.html (reporting on temporary restraining order
entered by Northern California federal district court, prohibiting leading anti-spam website
SpamCop and its parent IronPort Systems, on an interlocutory basis, from offering their
"blacklisting" and spam reporting techniques against notorious UCE purveyor Scott Richter and
his company OptlnRealBig.com, on the asserted grounds that SpamCop's actions interfered with
Richter's business and caused his ISP to block his company's e-mail. In a claim that would be
astonishing coming from anyone outside the ranks of unrepentant spammers, Richter also
invoked CAN-SPAM as an affirmative basis for granting relief to him, on the bizarre theory that
SpamCop's use of anonymized spai reports (employed for the purpose of preventing spammers
from redoubling their spam efforts against recipients who verified their identity by complaining
about alleged spam) somehow abetted violations of CAN-SPAM by inhibiting the ability to
remove complaining recipients from mailing lists); see also Peter A. Johnson, Preserving The
Promise of The E-mail Marketplace: An Economic Assessment of The Proposed Federal DO-
NOT-E-Mail Registry, Direct Marketing Association (Mar. 31, 2004), at http://www.the-
dma.org/antispam/final.pdf, p.5 ("New firms increase competition that drives down prices for
consumers and accelerates the introduction of productivity-enhancing products and procedures.
Legitimate commercial e-mail is uniquely positioned to reduce barriers to entry because of its
low per-contact cost (making it flexible enough for small marketing campaigns) and because of
its disproportionately high return on investment per contact, which facilitates rapid customer
acquisition-i.e., rapid business growth."); David Leonhardt, If Spam Vigilantes Break Out of
Cyberspace, at http://www.stickysauce.com/articles/advertisingpromotion/if-spamvigilantes
break out of cyberspace.html (providing commercial e-mailer's dystopian, if sub-Orwellian,
scenario of a heavily-regulated future in which senders of e-mail face various Draconian
sanctions for actions as simple as sending a resume to apply for a job with a company: "'But
doesn't every exchange begin with an unsolicited message,' I asked. 'Welcome to the post-
Internet world. The greatest communications tool of all time ended communications forever.'
'But what can we do about it?' I wanted to know. 'I don't know about you,' he said as he
slipped into his jacket. 'But I'm off to the freedom-of-speech bureau to report an unsolicited
conversation. They should be here soon to staple your mouth shut."'); see also Washington v.
Jason Heckel, d/b/a Natural Instincts, 24 P.3d 404, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 467 (2001) (reversing
trial court decision which had accepted defendant's argument that Washington State's then-in-
force anti-spam law violated the Interstate Commerce Clause by requiring UCE senders to
determine the state where each e-mail recipient resided; the Washington supreme court,
however, was less moved by defendant's arguments regarding unfair restraints on commerce,
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While this perspective has deep roots, its embrace by direct
marketers and other spammers should give everyone pause. Clearly,
some degree of "free information" analysis informed the CAN-SPAM
Act, which does little if anything to intrude on the free marketplace of
e-mail. This perspective, however, ignores the harsh realities of spam
and the independent dangers that it poses to Internet culture and
Internet infrastructure.
B. "The Market Has Failed"
Even Internet veterans, who might in other respects espouse the
rugged individualist view of the Internet as a medium whose potential
best thrives when left to the grassroots ingenuity of its atomistic,
distributed participants, seem less than convinced about the benefits
of a totally unregulated Internet and e-mail regime. Some believe that
bad information (such as spam) threatens to drive out the good
information whose free exchange was one of the exciting, and
potentially-liberating, promises of the Internet frontier. A vigorous
liberal economics-based embrace of the Internet and e-mail as
liberating, and profit enhancing, tools in a free market of information,
ideas, and goods and services does not imply wholesale acceptance of
a rule-free marketplace. Even ardent free market theorists may accept
that not all markets are purely efficient, and that less-than-efficient
markets are subject to failure.
From this perspective, rational regulation of the e-mail "market"
is entirely appropriate. How that regulation would occur, however,
and the extent of that regulation would depend on the perceived cause
of the market breakdown.
There are at least four generally-accepted causes of market
failures: (a) imperfect competition (i.e., the ability for monopolies to
exist on either side of the market transaction); (b) public goods (a
good which can only be provided, usually by the government, on a
freely-accessible basis to any who wish to use it); (c) asymmetric
information (i.e., the transaction parties do not have equal access to
information that would influence their willingness or ability to
consider rationally, and enter into for a fair price, the proposed
transaction); and (d) interference of externalities in the market (i.e.,
one or more market participants can impose a cost on another without
giving up anything of corresponding economic value, or can take
and after reversing the trial court's invalidation of the statute, remanded for trial court
proceedings that ended in a substantial monetary verdict against defendant (see Michael
Chissick, Putting a price on spare, INTERNET MAGAZINE (Mar. 2003)).
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something of economic value while imposing the costs thereof on
those who do not benefit from the transaction).98
The Internet as historically and currently constituted, and
commercial e-mail in particular, arguably are subject in a significant
degree to all but one of these causes of potential market failures (the
exception being imperfect competition, given that individuals' cheap
and ready access to Internet and e-mail facilities arguably render it
difficult for any one Nigerian, for instance, to comer the market in
fictitious government funds supposedly sequestered by a deposed
relative).
The Internet's origin's as a network (originally, under the
Defense Department-sponsored ARPANET) for communication of
technical information among defense researchers, including the
ability, implemented by the 1970s, to exchange person-to-person
mail-type electronic messages between the researchers, may
constitute a fundamental source of the difficulties encountered in
fighting spain today, even as the Internet has moved far beyond its
origins as a government-sponsored information exchange to
encompass and enable largely-private interests.99
Many of the basic characteristics and protocols for Internet
information exchange, and the assumptions as to how e-mail should
operate, have their origins in the era when Internet and e-mail were
provided as public goods and their users were presumed to be
productive researchers. The maximization of such researchers' free
information exchange was viewed as enhancing the public interest,
even if it did not directly defray the costs incurred by the network
provider(s). 00 For instance, there was no reason for the government-
98. See, e.g., http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-gsimon/ProfResp/MARKETFAILURES.pdf.
(some economists would also point to taxation as a market-distorting factor, but to date the
Internet and e-mail have not been subject to significant taxation, so we do not examine this
factor).
99. See generally Ian R. Hardy, The Evolution of ARPANET email, Thesis (Univ. Cal.
Berkeley) (1996), at http://www.ifla.org/documents/intemet/hari 1.txt.
100. See, e.g., Brad Templeton, Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of Spam, at
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spam/spam25.html (detailing first recorded large-scale UCE
sent over ARPANET, and noting that the only barriers then deemed necessary to prevent such
misuse were voluntarily-observed "acceptable use policies" among the small community of
ARPANET participants); see also Bills Digest No. 45 2003-04, Spam Bill 2003 (Australian
Parliament), at http://www.aph.gov.au/Iibrary/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd045.htm (noting, in
legislative history of anti-span bill, that ARPANET was intentionally developed on a
decentralized basis, with no single network administrator responsible for administration of the
entire network, partly in order to increase its robustness and resistance to disruption in the event
of nuclear attack or other localized network failure - a technical artifact that continues to make
centralized regulation of the Internet a difficult task).
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enabled ARPANET to develop strict technical protocols for
preventing spoofing or other alteration of source addresses for e-mail,
at least at a time when access to the system was limited to
government-approved researchers. 10 ' Additionally, certain crucial
functions of Internet governance (such as registration of, and dispute
resolution as to, domain names) continue to be delegated by national
governments to quasi-governmental bodies, who are mandated to
facilitate Internet service for the general public. However, such
bodies enjoy considerable discretion (free, as would a governmental
agency be, from market pressures) as to how they carry out these
functions.
10 2
The ready ability of e-mail senders to disguise the origin of a
message or to falsify the identity and contact details of a registrant for
a domain whose services are advertised by spain, provides a simple
instance of a second potential cause of market failure for commercial
e-mail transactions. That is, recipients of commercial e-mail will
often be in an asymmetric, and clearly inferior, position vis d vis the
originator of UCE as regards commercially-important details of the
transaction. Marketers have an incentive to be promiscuous in
spreading their messages to the four winds. It matters little where
these messages land, so long as some recipient can be enticed to buy
101. See Templeton, supra note 100.
102. See, e.g., Caslon Analytics Profile: ICANN and the UDRP (Oct. 2002), at
http://www.caslon.com.au/icannprofile5.htm (analyzing the role of the Internet Corporation For
Assigned Names And Numbers ("ICANN"), a private body authorized by the U.S. and other
governments to supervise Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation through its authorized
independent domain registrars, protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code
(ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root server system management
functions (all functions originally performed under U.S. Government contract by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and other entities):
[Some activists] argue that key governance decisions about central resources and
operations are being made by agencies such as ICANN that have quasi-
governmental powers, that operate on a global level but lack the accountability
of government. They also argue that there is real need to focus the attention of
civil society on seemingly technical issues determined by those agencies.
ICANN has recently been criticized specifically for lack of accountability and effective
oversight on spain issues, based on its alleged failure to require authorized registrars of domain
names (and their affiliated mailservers) to implement reliable verification of registrant's
"WHOIS" contact information and other particulars so that spammers can be readily traced and
pursued based upon their domain registration records. Such a failure would have significant
implications in view of the fact that many spammers register numerous domains using bogus
contact information in order further to mask themselves from public view or complaints. See
Jim Wagner, ICANN Reports On WHOIS Inaccuracies, internetnews.com (Mar. 31, 2004), at
http://www.intemetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3334181.
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the marketer's product at his asking price. 10 3 Conversely, numerous
pieces of information that would normally be crucial to a prudent
consumer's purchase decision can be concealed - or more often,
falsified - by merchants operating behind the anonymity of the
Internet and effectively-anonymous e-mail. 104  Such manipulated,
concealed, and falsified information can include the identity and
reputation of the merchant; the nature and reliability of the advertised
product; the product's ability to perform the advertised functions; and
the location and availability of the merchant if the customer requires
customer service or remedial action for product failure.
Especially as to products or services that may have a strong
emotional appeal to a customer (such as dating services or romantic
adjuncts), or that may be relatively unavailable through more
conventional and transparent channels (prescription drugs, cable
descramblers, and other products of dubious legality), or that make
not-readily-falsifiable claims of long-term benefit to the consumer
(such as business schemes), a customer's strong desire to obtain the
product or services in question may win out over sober second
thoughts when there is no ready or cost-efficient way to test or look
behind the multiple unproven assumptions contained in the
merchant's proposition. Such impulse purchasing could prove
problematic even if the product exists and has traits roughly according
with those described in the UCE, and the merchant can be trusted to
deliver it, because not every consummated transaction is a prudent
transaction.
Finally, externalities, perhaps the most common cause of market
failures, abound in the mass-mailed electronic commercial solicitation
market. The single most notable externality involved in UCE arises
out of the cost structure (or rather, lack of one) for sending e-mails.
Many have noted that the current system of e-mail provision makes it
possible for an e-mail sender to dispatch millions of e-mails without
incurring substantially greater costs than if he sent a few hundred10 5 -
103. Accordingly, the most important, and perhaps the only, piece of information that a
UCE marketer needs to ascertain with regard to his customer is that the customer's promise to
pay for his cable descrambler or growth hormone actuator or mortgage refinance application, as
the case may be, can be reliably converted into cash in the marketer's pocket. But this
information can be obtained fairly readily and cheaply through numerous credit card verification
and fulfillment systems or other Internet-enabled payment mechanisms.
104. See supra, note 8.
105. See, e.g., John Leyden, The economics of spae, THE REGISTER (Nov. 18, 2003), at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/l1/18/the economicsof spam/ ("[S]pam makes economic
sense, despite miniscule response rates, because spain can be sent at 'virtually no cost to
spammers.' Spam, unlike conventional junk mail, is growing exponentially because it costs
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indeed, e-mail is often regarded at the margins as an essentially free
form of communication.
Of course, the servers and bandwidth necessary to transmit huge
volumes of UCE are not, even in an era of cheap computing power,
free at all. Rather, the costs associated with transmission and receipt
of millions of spain messages (not to mention the costs of monitoring
and combating UCE message through such means as spam filters and
virus checkers) are simply localized at other nodes of the UCE loop -
viz., at the ISPs,10 6 network infrastructure providers, and UCE
recipients. 107
The negative externalities imposed by spam go beyond simply
the cost of processing, and combating, UCE. Many of the products
and services most popularly advertised through UCE are - charitably
put - of unproven value. They may in more than a few instances fail
to deliver upon the expansive, often creatively-phrased,10 8 promises
contained in the come-on to the consumer. Even the promulgators of
UCE who purport to operate on a "legitimate" basis have been forced
to concede that the proliferation of simply fraudulent UCE is
virtually nothing to send and all the costs of dealing with spain are dumped on its recipients....
[R]esponse rates to bulk commercial email is less than 0.005 per cent. That means that a typical
email message appeals to 50 people and annoys 999,950."); see also Andrew Leung, SPAM: The
Current State, Telus Corporation (Aug. 8, 2003), at
http://www.telusinternational.com/Download/spam.pdf, p.7-8 (noting that in the currently-
prevailing business model in which outgoing e-mail is not generally subject to strict volume
limits or charged to senders on a per-unit basis, and in which spammers can use techniques such
as open-relay hijacking to avoid any limits that do exist, spammers encounter essentially no
incremental financial disincentive not to maximize the volume of solicitations dispatched).
106. See, e.g., Christina Torode, Spam Leads To High Costs For ISPs,
INTERNETWEEK.COM (Apr. 28, 2003), at http://www.internetwk.con/breakingNews/
showArticle.jhtml ?articlelD=9400084 ("Spam costs these ISPs in many forms: the need for an
antispam staff; additional storage, bandwidth and software requirements; the need for resources
to develop homegrown solutions and additional man-hours to handle reconfigurations; and
lawsuits brought both against spammers and against the ISPs.... What's more, research firm
Gartner estimates that, on average, an ISP with I million users spends $7 million a year fighting
spam."
107. See, e.g., Leung, supra note 105, at 9 (estimating that, in the 2001-2003 time period,
individual companies lost approximately $8.9 billion, in aggregate, annually from spam, about
half of the estimated total coming from lost worker productivity in reading and discarding or
attempting to unsubscribe from spain messages, and the other half in purchasing more powerful
servers and greater hard drive space, increased network bandwidth, and help-desk support to
company users and customers for spam and relay hijack incidents).
108. See, e.g., Rick Conner, A gallery of classic spare, (Mar. 23, 2004) at
http://www.rickconner.net/spamweb/classicspam.html; see also Spam Examples, at
http://www.linuxfocus.org/common/src/article279/spam samples.html.
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threatening consumer confidence in all e-mail solicitations, and may
put a serious crimp in the potential growth of online commerce. 09
Not all externalities of UCE abuse are purely negative (at least
from the standpoint of some of the UCE's recipients). Some
spammers may actually deliver essentially what they advertise - say,
prescription drugs and narcotics not otherwise readily available to
consumers with no medical need for them, or who seek to circumvent
drug company pricing policies by ordering drugs (or their
unauthorized generic equivalents) from another jurisdiction. Thus, a
comparatively small number of UCE recipients who respond
favorably to solicitations for such drugs (or for illegal cable
descramblers, or pornography) may well enjoy (from their standpoint)
the benefit of access to products or services otherwise not readily
available to them. But millions of other recipients (and ISPs, and so
on) are forced to pay the price for those few consumers' "benefits," in
the form of dealing with untargeted mass UCE solicitations as to
which the vast number of recipients do not wish to avail of the
"positive" externality being proffered by the solicitor.
Accordingly, a market failure modality of analyzing the
problems of UCE could plausibly point to numerous structural flaws
in the current structure of, and economic model for, distribution and
fulfillment of e-mail, and in particular, UCE. From this standpoint,
the fundamental problem is not necessarily that free exchange of
information and goods is a bad thing. Rather, a "market failure"
proponent would be likely to advocate for those technical and
regulatory changes that offer the potential to eliminate unhelpful
historical artifacts in the Internet and e-mail business model and to
counterbalance the other arguably-skewed economic factors that
threaten to negate the Internet's great potential as a global, efficient
market in information, goods, and services.
C. "But What About The Children?"
The legislative history and text of the CAN-SPAM Act, and
many of the proposed state regulations, placed considerable emphasis
on the transmission of pornographic images and sexually-oriented
109. See, e.g., H. Robert Wientzen, TACKLING THE SPAM ISSUE: The DMA's answers
to one of the nation's toughest questions, DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, at http://www.the-
dma.org/memberguide/tacklingspam.shtml ("Unfortunately, in the public arena, some of those
negative sentiments about spam are impacting legitimate e-mail marketing. I've heard concerns
from DMA members about falling response rates and overly aggressive spam filters. And given
the unprecedented growth rates we've seen from spammers just this year, I fear we've only
begun to scratch the surface.").
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solicitations as one of the principal evils of unchecked UCE. Indeed,
many who would otherwise be loath to regulate e-mail in any way
would jump at the chance to regulate pornography.
Certainly, a significant amount of UCE relates to adult-oriented
services or products, often advertised using graphic language and
explicit photographs. The indiscriminate nature of spam solicitation
has meant that e-mail users (including children) who might otherwise
never be directly exposed to adult-oriented content have found it, to
their amazement, splashed across their computer screen upon opening
an e-mail message. While pornography-oriented solicitations in fact
appear to make up only a small minority of all UCE," ° their graphic
and controversial nature has played a disproportionately heavy role in
stoking anti-spam fervor."'1
More broadly, concern for public health and morals, and the
perceived threats posed to both by unregulated UCE, have supplied
motivation to a substantial segment of the anti-spam movement.
Most UCE is, after all, deceptive on some level - including, often, the
110. See, e.g., Lucy Sherriff, Sex, drugs and cans of spam, THE REGISTER (Feb. 19, 2004),
at http://www.theregister.com/2004/02/19/sex drugsand cans/ (citing statistics from e-mail
filtering firm Clearswift, showing that pornography-related e-mail constituted only 22% of spain
in January, 2004, as compared to pharmaceutical solicitations, which accounted for almost 43%
of all spain); see also Spare Statistics, BRIGHTMAIL, at http://www.brightmail.com/
spamstats.html (providing statistics from span filtering company Brightmail suggesting that
only 15% of UCE in March, 2004 was adult-oriented). As any statistics regarding spam are
based upon representative sampling of a particular e-mail recipient population, it is not always
clear how reliable and consistent such statistics are; for instance, the Brightmail statistics cited
above estimated that health or pharmaceutical-related spain made up only 7% of the total
volume in March, 2004, which is wildly at odds with Clearswifit's estimate that this category
accounted for almost half of all spam. See id.
I 1l. See, e.g., Press Release, Schumer, Christian Coalition Team Up To Crack Down On
Email Spain Pornography (June 12, 2003), at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/
SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PRO1782.html (announcing self-described "odd
couple" alliance between liberal Senator Charles Schumer and conservative Christian Coalition
in support of CAN-SPAM Act, citing statistics regarding widespread exposure of children to e-
mail based pornography (as well as conflating the non-e-mail-related problem of solicitation of
children by chat-room predators), and characterizing CAN-SPAM largely in terms of its
intended role in preventing pornographic e-mails: "The avalanche of pornography being sent to
kids by spammers makes checking email on par with watching an X-rated movie."); see also
Deborah Fallows, Spain: How It Is Hurting Email and Degrading Life on the Internet, PEW
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2003), p. 29, at
http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIPSpamReport.pdf:
There is a special place in Hell for pornographic spam. Throughout this study,
email users' reactions to spain containing adult content and pornography have
stood out. When asked to identify the type of content that bothers users most,
once again pornography exceeds all others, by nearly four times more than any
runner-up. People, and especially women and parents, hate it.
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substantive description of the goods or services being offered.
12
Quack herbal nostrums may have unexpected, and serious, side
effects not disclosed in the unregulated advertisements that tout
them. 13  According to Brightmail, an estimated twenty percent or
more of UCE consists of solicitations for investment in various
financial products, or simple stock tips touting over the counter
stocks; another seven percent consists of outright scams, such as the
infamous Nigerian '419' scheme." 4  A final five percent involves
"phishing" attacks disguised as e-mail from legitimate companies and
intended to inveigle recipients into supplying personal information
such as credit card numbers for "verification."" 5 The financial risks
to e-mail recipients from actually availing of the purported
opportunities or solicitations contained in such e-mails are substantial.
Finally, even as to solicitations that are "legitimate" from a
commercial perspective (i.e., that accurately describe and deliver
goods and services largely as promised), there may be additional
public policy problems perceived with allowing such transactions to
take place. The anonymity (for both seller and buyer) afforded by e-
mail based solicitations has tended to skew the product mix for UCE-
advertised goods to those products that (like pornography) may be in
high demand but as to whose purchase consumers might otherwise
encounter legal or social barriers. Many observers will likely
embrace, as valuable safeguards, existing legal and community-
mores-based barriers to obtaining, say, prescription painkillers or
tranquilizers for self-medication," 6 or to purchasing cable television
112. See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 50 (reporting random sampling of 1000 pieces of UCE
by the FTC, which found that 66% of the e-mails contained false or misleading information in
the body or the header/subject information, with 44% of the samples containing false or
misleading statements, claims, or characterizations in the sales pitch itself).
113. See, e.g., Glenda Patton, The dangers of drugs and herbal interactions, at
http://il.essortment.com/drugandherbal rgyv.htm.
114. 'Nigerian' e-mail scam netted millions: prosecutors, GLOBEANDMAIL.COM (Oct. 31,
2003), at http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20031031 .wscam 103l/
BNStory/Technology/ (describing charges brought against scammer who secured over four
million Canadian dollars using e-mail solicitations in which he purported to have access to
former Nigerian president's sequestered assets).
115. See Spam Statistics, Brightmail, at http://www.brightmail.com/spamstats.html. The
Clearswift breakdown of spam for the same month, March, 2004, once again contains
significantly different estimates from those of Brightmail. Though Clearswift cites a similar
number to Brightmail (26%) as to financial solicitations, it sets a much lower estimate than
Brightmail on the proportion of scam and phishing-related e-mails (classing just 0.4% of UCE
as unadulterated scams).
116. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Crackdown on Prescription Abuse. U.S. Officials Want
Better Monitoring, Control of Painkillers, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2004), available at
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descramblers.1 17 These observers may also tend to believe that
unregulated electronic commerce poses threats not only to unwitting
victims of scams and misleading advertisements, but also to weak-
willed buyers who are all too successful in consummating
transactions whose effect is deleterious to their own, or society's,
well-being.
Approaches to UCE that are inspired by a public health and
morals view of spain will likely continue to focus on legislative
provisions (such as those in the CAN-SPAM Act) requiring the
identification of adult-oriented materials (so that they may readily be
filtered or rejected), along with the other provisions of CAN-SPAM
(which could reduce the perils posed by spam that, while non-sexual
in nature, is still perceived as posing health, financial, or other risks to
individual consumers or to society). Stricter enforcement of existing,
non-e-mail-related, laws proscribing the underlying bad conduct
being promoted by UCE 118 is also likely to form a parallel route of
attack by those who view threats to consumer health and welfare and
public safety as a principal gravamen of spain.
Expecting industry to police itself in a potentially lucrative
marketplace may seem a low-percentage approach in any context, but
if appropriate pressure can be brought to bear at key points of the
supply chain, "legitimate" industry players may also be persuaded to
cooperate in limiting the ability of spammers to subvert public
policy.119
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20863-2004Marl.html (noting ready online
availability of opiates and other prescription drugs without prescription).
117. See, e.g., Jim Lawley, Despite sellers' claims, cable descramblers are illegal,
DECATUR DAILY (May 19, 2003), at http://www.decaturdaily.com/decaturdaily/livingtoday/
030519/cable.shtml (noting prevalence of e-mail solicitations for unauthorized descramblers
used to obtain free access to cable television programming).
118. Such as obscenity, see How to Report Possible Violations of the Federal Obscenity
Laws, Morality In Media, at http://www.obscenitycrimes.org/complaint/offine report fed.cfm;
improper prescription drug trafficking (21 U.S.C. §§ 353, 822, 829, 841); and illegal gambling
(18 U.S.C. § 1084).
119. For instance, manufacturers of controversial drugs such as anabolic steroids and
prescription painkillers have, following public outcry, adopted stricter regulation of the
downstream market for their products to prevent diversion and abuse. See, e.g., Action Plan to
Prevent the Diversion and Abuse of OxyContin®, United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs concernoxycodone/
abuse oxy.htm ("[Manufacturer] Purdue Pharma has been encouraged to develop a balanced
marketing strategy that ensures appropriate use of OxyContin®."); see also Press Release,
ASACP Received Over 2700 Suspect Child Pornography Reports in December '02 Compared to
1200 in December '01, (Jan. 2003), at http://www.asacp.org/press/press0l03b.html (detailing
efforts of adult website industry group ASACP to identify and report to authorities any parties
sending e-mail solicitations involving child pornography).
2004]
918 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LI.. [Vol. 20
Any attempt to regulate e-mail based upon its content raises the
specter of constitutional concerns - concerns that may be heightened
in the context of the "health and morals" approach to spam. Critics
and laws adopting this modality of viewing and attacking spam are
pretty clearly motivated, in part, by disagreement with the underlying
content of the message that the UCE promulgator is sending. The
government's ability to place reasonable restrictions on commercial
speech, however, is well-established. 120  The constitutionality of anti-
spam laws may be further bolstered by the inability of many
spammers to meet a threshold requirement for invoking commercial
free speech defenses - namely, that the speech for which protection is
sought pertains to lawful activity and is not misleading. 121 Still, past
governmental attempts at regulating speech, specifically in the online
context, have not fared uniformly well. 22  Even the limits on adult-
oriented e-mails imposed by the CAN-SPAM Act are under attack in
some quarters as constitutionally infirm.'
23
E-mail has exposed consumers to new opportunities for
information and commercial transactions; but not all available
information, and not all possible transactions, will conduce to the
individual or collective good. Views will vary on how tightly
commercial speech needs to be regulated in the context of e-mail.
But it seems inevitable that UCE policy will continue to be driven in
significant part by those who believe that consumers' health, safety,
and morality need to be protected from the blandishments of e-mail
120. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 477 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (applying a four part analysis to restrictions on advertising, including
determining: (1) whether the advertisement concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2)
whether the government interest in regulating the advertisement is substantial; (3) whether the
restriction directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and finally, (4) whether the
restriction is more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest).
121. Id. ("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial
speech related to illegal activity.") (citations omitted).
122. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002) (upholding injunction against
enforcement of Child Online Protection Act and its prohibitions on electronic communications
containing "material harmful to minors"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 821 (1997) (holding key
provisions of Communications Decency Act unconstitutional).
123. See, e.g., Comments of the Center for Democracy and Technology on Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Proposed Mark for Sexually Oriented Span, (Feb. 17, 2004), at
http://www.cdt.org/speech/spam/20040217cdt.shtm (arguing that the FTC ought not to
implement a requirement of a subject-line label identifying all adult-oriented UCE as such, even
though CAN-SPAM clearly sets forth such a requirement, and instead arguing for an alternative
approach not subject to the perceived constitutional problems of the labeling procedure
prescribed by the statute).
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solicitations for harmful or fraudulent products - as well as from their
own credulity and venality.
D. "Western Science Is So Wonderful"' 24
To some, weary or wary of legislative attempts to stop spam, or
simply more enamored of technological solutions to a technology-
facilitated problem, victory in the UCE wars will come through
superior technological firepower, not through any legal or regulatory
approach. After all, the ease with which spammers operate is, in part,
a technological artifact of the open communications framework set up
for the small ARPANET community. Surely, some reason, the
technological loopholes that allow spammers to flourish can be closed
by the combined technical skills of computer science companies,
institutions, and public-spirited hackers.125
Certainly there are significant technical weaknesses in the
current e-mail infrastructure. Minimizing the ability readily to spoof
return address information comes to mind as one obvious (if not
necessarily easy) step to limiting the anonymity (and thus lack of
accountability) of UCE originators. It has ranked high among the
proposed technical solutions to spam.' 26  A number of technical
124. Cordwainer Smith, Western Science Is So Wonderful, in IF, DECEMBER 1958 79-89
(Damon Knight ed., 1958).
125. See, e.g., Hanah Metchis, Technology, Not Regulation, Takes a Bite out of Spam,
Competitive Enterprise Institute (Apr. 30, 2003) ("[lt's not surprising that innovation in
technological anti-spam solutions is taking off at incredible rates.... This evolving variety of
approaches is more likely to alleviate the problem than Congressional solutions."); Scarlet
Pruitt, In Search of the Perfect Span Filter: Techies immerse themselves in spam to craft afilter
that renders mass e-mail marketing ineffective (and undesirable), PCWORLD (Jan. 17, 2003), at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,108859,00.asp (noting spam filter creators' belief
that "if there is widespread adoption of filters that are accurate enough to make spamming
economically prohibitive, the problem will cease without the need for legislation or other
measures."); Gates: Span To Be Canned By 2006, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 24, 2004), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/24/tech/main595595.shtml (quoting Microsoft Corp.
chairman Bill Gates as promising that "Two years from now, spam will be solved" by
technological measures).
126. See, e.g., Caller ID for E-Mail Technical Specification, MICROSOFT (Feb. 24, 2004),
at http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spamcallerid.mspx (outlining Microsoft
proposal to address domain spoofing by verifying that each e-mail message originates from the
Internet domain that it purports to); The Absolute Ultimate Spam Protection, GEEK NEWS
CENTRALCOM (Dec. 9, 2003), at http://www.geeknewscentral.com/archives/001985.html
(reporting favorably on proprietary spam elimination program WCSAP, whose provider notes
that the program employs anti-spoofing verification technology because "[p]art of the problem
is that spammers have exploited certain loopholes in the email SMTP [Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol basic Internet e-mail standard] technology .... WCSAP [becomes] essentially an
SMTP standards compliancy testing software."); A Plan for No Spam, at p. 13, VERISIGN
(2003), at http://www.verisign.com/resources/wp/spam/no spam.pdf ("Detecting false sender
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approaches to authentication of sender identity exist. These proposals
include "passive" schemes largely transparent to the sender and
recipient of the e-mail (such as improved tracking of SMTP and DNS
(Domain Name Server) routing information). Other suggested
solutions involve "active" approaches requiring some action or
selection by sender or recipient. Such actions could include
comparing originating e-mail addresses against a "whitelist" of
trusted originating domains to which received e-mails will be
compared, or employing "challenge-response" protocols requiring
that the sender execute some confirmation step or routine
(presumably, a routine not readily performed by automated means)
before the message is delivered.
E-mail filters have also attracted considerable attention in the
anti-spam world, and probably constitute the most important
currently-implemented technological measure for spam control. Early
filters were static rule-based programs that applied periodically-
updated decision rules based upon a finite set of known characteristics
of sampled spam.127  More sophisticated Bayesian filters have
recently come on the market. Bayesian filters search for patterns of
word usage in a user's received e-mails (and their headers) and
classify as spam those e-mails showing patterns suspiciously close to
those of known spam, in a manner akin to simple rule-based filters.
128
But Bayesian filters also offer the promise of dynamic detection rules.
That is, the filters can be written so as to "learn" incrementally, in a
form of artificial intelligence ("Al"). As the corpus of inspected e-
mail for a user or group of users grows larger, certain terms and
patterns are determined likely to be characteristic of spam, and others
characteristic of legitimate e-mail of a particular user, so that
weighted spain-screening routines can be applied based on such
addresses would be a simple task but for the fact that the SMTP protocol allows a sender to
forge a message that purports to come from any sender.").
127. Paul Graham, Stopping Spam, http://www.paulgraham.com/stopspam.html (last
visited May 25, 2004).
The main disadvantage of rule-based filters is that they tend to have high false positive rates -
often as high as .5%. Another disadvantage is that the rules are static. When spammers learn
new tricks, the filter's authors have to write new rules to catch them. And because rule-based
filters are static targets, spammers can tune their mails to get past them. Sophisticated
spammers already test their mails on popular rule-based filters before sending them. In fact,
there are sites that will do this for free.
128. See, e.g., Paul Graham, Will Filters Kill Spam?, (Dec. 2002), at
http://www.paulgraham.com/wfks.html ("What's going to happen as this new generation of
spam filters get delivered to end-users? The most exciting possibility is that they may make
spam go away.").
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patterns. 29 Although originators of Bayesian filters claim impressive
spain-blocking results, 30  such filters are not without their
weaknesses. There exists the risk of "false positives," which leads to
rejection of legitimate e-mail. 131  There is also the possibility that
spammers will, as they already appear to be attempting, tailor the text
of their e-mails to include many randomly-generated "innocuous"
words and phrases in an effort to give the appearance of legitimate e-
mail when scanned by the filter.'
32
A more aggressive technical approach to spam-fighting arises
out of the hacker fringe of the programming world, and consists of
direct action (or as some would put it, vigilantism) against spammers,
aimed at interfering with their ability to conduct their business
profitably. Blacklists that are distributed publicly, for use by ISPs
and others in blocking all e-mail from known spam-originating
domains, represent a comparatively mild form of direct action. But
even blacklists have faced challenges from UCE originators alleging
129. See, e.g., Heinz Tschabitscher, What You Need To Know About Bayesian Span
Filtering, ABOUT.COM ("[T]he message can be used to train the filter further .... Using this
auto-adaptive technique, Bayesian filters can learn from both their own and the user's decisions
(if she manually corrects a misjudgment by the filters). The adaptability of Bayesian filtering
also makes sure they are most effective for the individual email user. While most people's spam
may have similar characteristics, the legitimate mail is characteristically different for
everybody.").
130. See, e.g., Paul Graham, Better Bayesian Filtering, (Jan. 2003), at
http://www.paulgraham.com/better.html (claiming 99.5% success in detecting spam using
author's Bayesian filter).
13 1. See, e.g., Bayesian Filtering: The Spam Fights Back, THE FISHBOWL (Sep. 4, 2003),
at http://fishbowl.pastiche.org/2003/09/04/bayesian filteringthe spam fights-back (discussing
problems with false positives in Bayesian filtering).
132. See id. ("[i]f we had a more sophisticated linguistic filter, it wouldn't be hard for
spammers to come up with a program that generated random, but grammatically correct
sentences"); Graham, supra note 127 (theorizing that the use of completely innocuous random
text, coupled with a URL to the spammer's website, could defeat even some sophisticated
Bayesian filters); see also Bruce Bower, Mind-Expanding Machines, SCIENCE NEWS (Aug. 30,
2003), at 136 (reporting on dissidents within the Al community who "dismiss[] the influential
Turing Test [which evaluates the success of machine intelligence by testing whether the
machine is capable of behaving indistinguishably from a person] as a guiding principle for Al
research," based in part on Al research's "failure to create the insightful computers envisioned
by the field's founders nearly 50 years ago;" cf Michael Slater, Spam That Almost Passed The
Turing Test, BLACK COFFEE (June 17, 2003), at http://karavshin.orgblogs/black-
coffee/archive/000426.html (suggesting that spammers and filter builders may be engaged in an
arms race, in which it is unclear which side will produce the more-intelligent text-processing
robots, based on sophisticated auto-generated e-mail solicitation incorporating multiple quotes
from recipient's weblog. The use of weblog quotes attributable to the recipient of the UCE
could be anticipated to give "non-spam" indicators when processed through a Bayesian filter
whose database is built in part on the weblog author's own legitimate e-mail corpus, which may
well include words and phrasing similar to that in his weblog).
922 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 20
that the distribution of such lists effects tortious interference with
their business operations."' Much of the public undoubtedly has a
low opinion of the way UCE promulgators earn a living, and of any
alleged constitutional or other justification for mass dispatch of
fraudulent spain UCE originators, though, when successfully
identified and pursued, have proven more than willing to wrap
themselves in the banner of the First Amendment and free trade, and
have filed their own actions against anti-spain activists based on a
variety of theories. 1
34
Still, bolder souls in the anti-spamming community soldier on
with proposed direct-action-based solutions such as FFBs ("Filters
that Fight Back"). Such programs combine standard filtering
functions with "bots" configured to "crawl" to any domain address
embedded in a suspected spam, thus potentially overwhelming the
spam beneficiary's host domain bandwidth as millions of filters send
a query to the domain upon recognizing the suspected spam.1
35
Although such tactics arguably skirt close to being an unlawful denial
of service ("DoS") attack in their own right, 136 there are more than a
few frustrated spam victims in the programming community who
seem to have reached the measured conclusion that extremism in the
defense of liberty from spam is no vice.
37
133. See, e.g., Jay Hollander, Anti-Spam Vigilantes and the Law, GIGALAW.COM (July
2003), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003-al/hollander-2003-07-all.html ("The tort of
interference with business involves an effort to drive someone out of business or to harm the
business. According to some, that is precisely what anti-spammers are trying to accomplish,
without distinguishing between fraudulent spammers and legitimate e-mail marketers."). It is
questionable whether a prima facie tortuous interference suit against blacklist promulgators
could be made out today, to the extent that the blacklist could be shown to contain only domains
whose operators had routinely ignored CAN-SPAM's requirements. Early tortious interference
allegations were premised on the assumption that UCE was presumptively-lawful commercial
speech.
134. See, e.g., Jackie Cohen, Who's Spamming Whom?, BEACHBROWSER.COM (1999), at
http://www.beachbrowser.com/Archives/News-and-Human-Interest/September-99/Whos-
Spamming-Whom.htm (recounting AOL's pursuit of notorious UCE entrepreneur Sanford
Wallace: "Wallace, like the spammer-defendants who followed, claimed he had a First
Amendment right to send spam, and that it was a violation of antitrust laws for AOL to block
him from sending spam.").
135. See Graham, Stopping Spam, supra note 127.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Karl Bode, Wired Vigilantes: Spam battle gets uglier still, BROADBAND
REPORTS.COM (Aug. 8, 2003), at http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/32043 (despairing of
any aid being forthcoming from the "utterly flabbergasted and clueless" FTC leadership, and
concluding that "[a]s our Spam forum repeatedly indicates, the only thing that seems to really
have an impact on spam... is vigilantism. Users who are tired of receiving garbage in their
inboxes are often hunting the spammer down and doing their best to put them out of business.");
Jay Lyman, Spotlight Forces Exit of New Zealand Spam King, LINUXINSIDER (Aug. 25, 2003),
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The final major approach to technological resolution of the spam
problem actually combines technology with economics, seeking to
impose infinitesimal delays or costs upon each individual e-mail.
Such an approach would - ideally - have a completely unnoticeable
effect on any individual or legitimate business e-mail user. But, or so
the theory goes, the intentionally-imposed micro-inefficiencies would
impose death by a million cuts upon UCE originators, who rely on
rapid, and low-incremental-cost, transmission of literally millions of
solicitations to maintain a profit margin based upon the minuscule
response rate to their solicitations.
So called "slow sender" approaches would require each
computer transmitting an e-mail message to perform a somewhat-
time-consuming arbitrary calculation before dispatching the e-mail,
thus imposing a fraction of a second's delay on each e-mail; irrelevant
to individual users, but fatal to spam servers.' 38 Unfortunately, such
an approach might require adoption of entire new e-mail protocols. If
such new protocol adoption were readily-achievable, though, more
secure and "spoof proof' versions of SMTP would have emerged
years ago as an even more direct solution to the spam problem,
instead of remaining a distant promise.139
at http://www.linuxinsider.com/perI/story/31421.html (conceding, in course of otherwise-
disapproving account of harassment of admitted New Zealand spammer Shane Atkinson, who
volunteered to stop his activities once his personal contact information was posted on the
Internet, that "Atkinson's outing might have been more effective at deterring the 'spam king'
than any of the many U.S. legislative efforts to stem the tide of unwanted e-mail."); see also
Lawrence Lessig, A Bounty on Spammers, EWEEK (Sep. 16, 2002), at
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1238770,00.asp (expressing caution regarding current
"vigilante" anti-spam efforts, but agreeing that:
[Spammers] know that attorneys general and ISPs have better things to do than
track them down. By making them the only enforcers, spammers know that any
law aimed at stopping them will likely not be enforced.... If we deputized the
tens of thousands of qualified people out there who are able to hunt offenders,
then a large number of offenders would be identified and caught.
But see Lester Haines, US Man threatens anthrax attack on spammers, THE REGISTER (Nov. 24,
2003), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/l 1/24/us-man-threatensanthrax-attack/ (outlining
possible five year prison term faced by California programmer whose frustration with repeated
spam solicitations boiled over into dubious forms of self-help: "Charles Booher, 44, apparently
snapped after his computer was deluged with ads offering a larger penis and, presumably not
requiring a larger penis at that time, launched a terror campaign against the Canadian company
he blamed for the outrage.").
138. See Graham, Stopping Spam, supra note 127.
139. See id. (arguing that spamners could likely readily defeat any required time-delaying-
calculation, and that "[w]hatever these [slow server] computations were, they couldn't be too
arduous, because legitimate corporate mail servers have to be able to send high volumes of
mail.").
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Another popular proposal for shifting some of the costs of spain
back to spammer is the previously-discussed "penny an e-mail"
'postage' proposal, which Microsoft, among others, has
championed.1 40  However, any Internet postage scheme likely will
face great resistance from the independent-minded Internet grassroots
and libertarian factions. Moreover, Internet postage schemes have
elicited harsh criticism from computer experts as posing
"insurmountable" technical problems and threatening serious, but
unpredictable, negative effects on the online world.1
4 1
The keen interest of large companies such as Microsoft in
technological solutions to UCE may arise from disinterested concern
for its end users' convenience, but seems more likely to be the
product of these companies' concern for the millions of dollars that
stand to be earned in peddling even partially-effective spain
solutions. 142 Indeed, some have even suggested that by treating spain
principally as a business opportunity for providing a "killer
application" spam solution, major software and Internet companies
have contributed to the spam problem (or, as an economic observer of
UCE might put it, have done little more than shift the balance of
externalities imposed by spam, with little net benefit to its victims). 43
UCE is a problem having a technical origin, but the financial and
social factors' 44 contributing to spare's success suggest that no purely-
140. Gates: Buy stamps to send e-mail: Paying for e-mail seen as anti-span tactic, (Mar.
5, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECHIintemet/03/05/spam.charge.ap/ (describing
proposals by Microsoft's Bill Gates and companies such as Goodmail for quasi-postage systems
as antidote to spain: "At perhaps a penny or less per item, e-mail postage wouldn't significantly
dent the pocketbooks of people who send only a few messages a day. Not so for spammers who
mail millions at a time.").
141. See An Overview of E-Postage, Taughannock Networks (Feb. 2004), at
http://www.taugh.com/epostage.pdf (citing the massive costs of creating a computer finance and
monitoring system robust enough to track and clear payment for the billions of e-mails sent each
day; the likelihood of sparnmer attempts to forge or hijack postage authentication; and consumer
distrust of"micropayment" systems as intrinsic flaws in almost all electronic postage schemes).
142. See, e.g., Tim Lemke, E-mail filters prove big business as spain pours in; Software
firms watch revenue soar, WASHINGTON TIMES (July 17, 2003), at
http://washingtontimes.com/business/20030716-112006-4134r.htm ("The market to block spam
from entering corporate e-mail systems was worth nearly $120 million last year and will grow to
$750 million by 2007, according to International Data Corp., a Framingham, Mass., technology-
research group.").
143. See, e.g., David Berlind, Greed: the real reason for Sobig and MyDoom 's "success
ZDNET (Feb. 2004) ("Were it not for the greed of many e-mail technology companies and
[ISPs] who are looking for ways to capitalize on the root cause of [damaging "worms" spread by
e-mail] (spam), a majority of the undesirable results from Sobig and MyDoom... could have
been avoided.").
144. See, e.g., Graham, Will Filters Kill Spain?, supra note 128:
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technological analysis of, or attack upon, spam is likely to yield
completely successful results.
E. "Why Bother?"
A fifth way of looking at spam arguably enjoyed a quiet vogue in
the United States, at least in official circles, for many years. Some
officials and commentators still seem to embrace this view: namely,
that spam is an inevitable and insoluble (but manageable) fact of
online life. The FTC's failure, over many years, to adopt a role much
more active than that of spam museum curator seems to support the
notion that the analytical framework chosen for analyzing UCE has
significant effects on the action (if any) that the analyzing party will
adopt, or even contemplate as feasible, for fixing it.
Of course, the FTC was not alone in viewing UCE problems as
beyond the realm of any practical solution. Congress's long-delayed
efforts at enacting a federal anti-spain statute (see supra Section II)
veered between ineffectual paroxysms of alarm at the menace of
spam, and overly-blithe assurances that often-simplistic statutory
provisions would be sufficient to annihilate UCE abuse.
One variant of the "no solution to spam" worldview is that the
Internet is inherently unsecurable, and thus there will always be
significant gaps in any technological protection scheme. 145 Notably,
this view is not inconsistent with adopting portions of the
technological-solutions oriented analysis of spain. Indeed, the same
person may simultaneously be pessimistic about the ability of
technology ever effectively to eliminate UCE abuse, while still
adopting certain technological countermeasures that he finds partially
effective. 1
46
The person who responds to spam is a rare bird. Response rates can be as low as
15 per million. That's the whole problem: spammers waste the time of a million
people just to reach the 15 stupidest or most perverted.
If we want to make spam stop working, we have to somehow prevent the 15
idiots from responding to the spams that are sent to them. Otherwise the
spammers will keep sending it to everyone. So, strangely enough, whether or not
filtering will kill sparn depends entirely on what those 15 idiots do.
145. See Fighting a Losing Battle Against Spain, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 16, 2003), at
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1446_A 809287,00.html; Lee Ann Roman, Solutions
for deleting pesky span problem are slippery, BIZWOMEN.COM (Nov. 14, 2003), at
http://www.bizjoumals.com/memphis/stories/2003/l/17/focus4.html ("[C]ombating spam will
be a continual investment for businesses because solutions must change to meet the problem,
technology managers say.").
146. See, e.g., Anti Spam Fanatics, at http://www.mailmsg.com/SPAM anti
spamfanatics.htm (bemoaning fact that "there is no solution for spam. Period. Nothing works
well, no solution is perfect, and due to the design of intemet email, nothing can ever work well.
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Another variant of this analysis often does not reach the issue of
whether regulation of, or high-tech countermeasures against, UCE are
feasible, because this variant approach regards any threat posed by
UCE as minimal and not worth taking the time to complain about, or
waste government or technologists' time on.147  This "just press
delete" school of thought may never have been very widespread
beyond the ranks of self-interested marketers trying to soothe enraged
spain recipients. But if disinterested parties ever believed that simply
ignoring or deleting unwanted UCE was an option, it seems doubtful
whether they would remain as sanguine today, when the volume of
spam and the pernicious tactics used to disseminate it have expanded
many-fold.
148
A final species of the "spam is insoluble" mindset arose from the
belief that no legal remedies were practically available against UCE
abuse. Some argued, for instance, that enacting state or national anti-
spam laws was pointless because most spam originated from, or could
be moved to, offshore domains beyond the territorial reach of such
laws. 14 9  We have discussed at length (and will further mention in
At least, not without some serious changes to the basic design of email," but also describing
author's implementation of filtering and other counter-measures as partial remedies that
decreased incoming spam on his computer).
147. See, e.g., Barry Dennis, Why I love spare, CNET NEWS (May 16, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2010-1071-915523.html ("There are some e-mails I get that I don't want
or appreciate: pornography, two credit card offers every day.., and some others. But you know
what I do? Hit delete. I hit delete, and I'm free."); Online Marketers Say So-Called Spain
Threat Is Overblown, INTERNETWEEK.COM (June 27, 2003), at
http://www.internetweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=10809956 (quoting electronic
marketing businessman: "Really, there are more important things in life [than spam regulation].
. . . Nobody likes spain, junk mail, commercials, billboards, telephone solicitors and of course
door-to-door salespeople .... But hey, everything comes with a price, including freedom.").
148. Press Release, Eliminating Spain Requires Team Effort: New Technology and
Precautions by Computer Users Take Biggest Bite Out of Spain, MICROSOFT (Mar. l1, 2004)
(continuing Microsoft's longstanding advice to "just delete" spare, but also recommending use
of filters and e-mail address concealment).
149. See, e.g., California spammers to move offshore, VIGILANT.TV (Oct. 4, 2002), at
http://vigilant.tv/article/2294 (citing California's spain regulation efforts as "a neat example of
why anti-spain laws can't possibly work .... even if they're successful [in identifying
California-based UCE], spaminers will simply move offshore."); Phil Raymond, Will the
vendetta against spai kill e-mail as we know it?, SEARCHSECURITY.COM (June 30, 2003), at
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/,289483,sidl4_gci912603,00.html ("In fact, most spam
originates from outside the United States in the Baltic and far-east .... The ability for any
government to trace and prosecute a sender for harassing individual recipients is impractical and
futile in its potential for prosecution."); but see Press Release, Sophos outs 'dirty dozen' spain
producing countries, (Feb. 26, 2004), at http://www.sophos.com/spaminfo/articles/
dirtydozen.html ("'The United States is far and away the worst offender, accounting for nearly
60 percent of the world's span.. ); Debunking Offshore Spain, TAINT.ORG, at
http://taint.org/2003/11/24/191116a.html (ranking U.S. as chief source of spam originators and
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Subsection (F) infra) the challenges to legislative or regulatory
attempts to define and regulate UCE or spam. However, the most
fundamental form of the "no legal remedy" school of thought did not
merely point to practical challenges in implementing anti-spam laws.
Instead, it effectively denied that spam was subject to legal redress in
the first place.
Many a rueful commentator shook his head before the effective
date of the CAN-SPAM Act, citing as the central problem in any
spam regulation attempt the "fact" that "spam is not illegal."' 50 This
was certainly the view taken by most of the government, most of the
time.15' Given what we now know, and what the government could
have then known, regarding the disproportionately-fraudulent nature
of most UCE return address and header information, not to mention
the often-illegal nature of the goods and services being touted by
spam, 52 and the racketeer-like organization and conspiring of spam
gangs, 53 it should not have taxed the imagination of a regulator 154 or
prosecutor as much as it apparently did in many cases to develop
grounds for criminal or civil action against UCE abusers,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific anti-spain statute.
155
Several spammers were subjected to criminal and civil penalties for
beneficiaries, though U.S. based spammers may mask this fact by using hijacked foreign relay
computers; and arguing that even if majority of spammers were offshore operators, "'that fact
does not negate the need for or effectiveness of laws against those in the US. It can be very
difficult to bring a murderer to justice in the US if they escape abroad, but no one could
seriously argue that this fact means domestic murder laws are unnecessary or irrelevant."'
(citation omitted)).
150. See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Bogus Boca: The Spa for Spain, MIAMI HERALD (May 29,
2003), at www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/fred_grimm/5964205.htm
(describing career of accused arch-spammer and convicted criminal Eddy Main, but noting that
"spam is not illegal.").
151. See, e.g., James Gleick, Tangled Up In Span, NY TIMES (Feb. 3, 2003), at
http://www.noblit.com/docslTangled-Up-In-Spam.pdf (noting as of 2003 that FTC repository
for spam was receiving about 85,000 alleged spasm daily, and that "[e]very month or so, the
commission files an enforcement action against someone, leading to a warning letter, or a
promise by the spammer to cease and desist... The agency can't help noticing that, by and
large, spam is not illegal.").
152. See supra notes 8, 109 and accompanying text.
153. See Gleick, supra note 151.
154. Id. (quoting FTC staff lawyer explaining that the agency cannot pursue most
spammers, only those involved in "deceptive" conduct, then allowing in response to reporter's
inquiry that "Maybe there's a deceptive statement about how your name was acquired" in false
representations that UCE is being sent to consumers based on previous (and non-existent) opt-in
or "subscription").
155. See, e.g., Doug Isenberg, Despite Outcry, Existing Laws Already Restrict Spam,
GIGALAW.COM (Sept. 2000), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2000-all/isenberg-2000-09a-
all.html.
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pre-CAN-SPAM Act conduct. 156 These successful investigations and
prosecutions indicate that even without a spain-specific federal law,
spammers were not immune from the tender attentions of vigorous
and imaginative police and prosecutors.' 57 Conversely, some in law
enforcement positions acted (and perhaps continue to act) less
effectively against spain than they might otherwise have done, due to
an apparent inability to envision the problem in any light other than
that of the long-stalled federal spain prohibition, despite clear
evidence of UCE abuses that constituted violations of many already-
existing legal prohibitions.
F. "The Legal System Is Working... Sort Of'
No one who deals with an e-mail account on a daily basis would
be rash enough to suggest that the current legal regime has abolished
the spain problem. But some do view the spain problem as
fundamentally amenable to significant amelioration through legal
mechanisms. 1
58
Believing that laws are among the proper tools to deploy against
UCE abuse does not answer two crucial subsidiary questions: which
laws can be effective against spain, and how effective need they be?
156. See supra Section IV(c); see also Saul Hansell, Virginia Indicts 2 Under Antispam
Law, NY TIMES at C4 (Dec. 12, 2003) (announcing indictments under Virginia's unsolicited
bulk e-mail criminal statute); Paul Roberts, 'Buffalo Spammer' convicted, COMPUTERWORLD
(Apr. 1, 2004), at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/cybercrime/
story/0,10801,91823,00.html?SKC=security-91823 (detailing conviction of notorious 'Buffalo
Spammer' on charges of identity theft and falsifying business records in connection with his
setting up of multiple e-mail accounts in other parties' identities for purpose of concealing UCE
activity).
157. The demonstrably-fraudulent nature of much UCE also largely obviates the oft-
voiced pessimism that stringent anti-spain legislation would face significant constitutional
hurdles, under even the diluted protections afforded to commercial speech, given the
prerequisite that such commercial speech not be deceptive or unlawful in nature.
158. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 127 (endorsing anti-spain laws in concept, although
warning that careful drafting to avoid loopholes, and strong enforcement, will be necessary to
achieve such laws' potential to "eliminate 80% of spam, if done right."); Dennis McCafferty,
Can CAN-SPAM Really Stop Spammers?, WEB HOSTING MONTHLY (Jan. 2004), at
http://thewhir.com/features/can-spam.cfm (quoting e-mail performance management expert
Matt Blumberg: "Will [CAN-SPAM] have a positive impact in the war on spain?
Absolutely .... [T]his legislation should help lessen spam by giving the federal government the
authority it needs to hand out fines and jail time to offenders; by setting clear minimum
standards for legitimate mailers to follow; and, perhaps most useful of all, by providing a way
for the average consumer to identify and report spam.").
2004] SPAM AFTER CAN-SPAM
Beyond its sponsors,"5 9 no one seems to believe that CAN-
SPAM alone, at least as currently implemented, will have much
noticeable effect in curbing spam. With a few anomalous
exceptions, 160 spam volumes do not seem to be decreasing at all in the
months since the Act went into force, but are instead increasing.16
Nonetheless, ISPs and others affected by spam continue to devote
considerable resources to litigation under both the Act1 62 and other
legal theories. 163  These efforts indicate that companies and
individuals continue to believe that anti-spari laws, individually or in
combination, can provide meaningful redress justifying the expensive,
and often frustrating, task of chasing UCE promulgators to ground.
AOL's recent, and highly-publicized, contest giving away a Porsche
seized in satisfaction of a pre-CAN-SPAM civil judgment against a
spammer sent a clear signal that corporations affected by spam would
seek to punish alleged spammers by attacking their most treasured
assets, through a variety of avenues, so as to reduce the perceived
financial incentives to set up shop as a UCE distributor.
1 64
But how much litigation and regulatory success is enough to
stem the tide of spam? If it is true that spammers can profit with
159. Amit Asaravala, With This Law, You Can Spain, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2004), at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,62020,00.html (quoting, skeptically, spokesman
for Act sponsor Sen. Ron Wyden as arguing that CAN-SPAM, despite pre-empting state anti-
spain statutes, will empower states to fight spam more effectively because of its authorizations
of civil actions by state attorneys general).
160. See Janis Mara, AOL Reports Drops in Both E-Mail and Spam Volume, CLICKZNEWS
(Mar. 19, 2004), at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3328841 (reporting 37% drop in
incoming AOL messages identified as spam during early months of 2004).
161. See supra notes 74.
162. See Kris Oser, Big ISPs File Suits Under Can Spain, DIRECT NEWSLINE (Mar. 10,
2004), at http://www.directmag.com/ar/marketingbigisps file/ (reporting filing of six lawsuits
against hundreds of named and John Doe defendants by ISPs AOL, Earthlink, Microsoft, and
Yahoo for a variety of alleged violations of the Act in connection with millions of solicitations
sent to the ISPs domains. The DMA cooperated with and supported the ISPs in their lawsuit
filing, and Act co-sponsor Sen. Conrad Burns used the occasion to laud CAN-SPAM as
"empower[ing] Internet users as they navigate the Net.").
163. See, e.g., Brian McWilliams, No Truce in the Spam Wars, WIRED (Sept. 10, 2003), at
http://www.wired.comr/news/business/0,1367,60357,00.html (reporting on crusading anti-spam
lawyer Pete Wellborn's campaign against Boca Raton-based alleged spammers, in which he
sought attorneys fees and threatened to follow up on previous multi-million dollar verdicts
against spamrnmers, based on allegedly-frivolous litigation brought by UCE front-group
EMarketers America.org seeking to curtail anti-spain activism).
164. Spammer 's Porsche up for grabs, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3581435.stm (detailing raffle of $47,000 sports car seized
from unidentified spamner who made over one million dollars by sending one billion e-mails
flogging pornography, college diplomas, illegal cable descramblers, and other products to AOL
members).
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response rates of fifteen out of one million, it seems that only a law
(or combination of laws) significantly more stringent than CAN-
SPAM could, standing alone, provide sufficient disincentive to
spammers to induce them to eschew the still-relatively-small risks
they incur in sending out their anonymous missives. Of course, this
calculus could be changed if technological or standards-based
developments significantly diminished the ease with which spammers
can currently hide the source of UCE.
Other deficiencies in our factual knowledge of the true nature of
the spam epidemic may also make it difficult, even for those
committed to a civil and criminal law-enforcement approach to
battling UCE, to assess realistically the odds of success from such an
approach. For instance, the commonly-encountered anecdotal
statement that a small number of hugely-prolific U.S.-based spam
gangs account for a substantial majority of spam 165 would - if true -
lend greater credence to the view that a coordinated U.S. law
enforcement approach could ultimately remove a substantial
proportion of spam from the e-mail stream. Conversely, if the
sources of spam are significantly more diffuse than the anecdotal
figure suggests, legal action against individual spanmers could
appear much less promising. It would be comforting to think that the
FTC, in its decade-long, placid contemplation of the contents of its
spam museum, had been making meaningful qualitative and
quantitative evaluations of such strategically-crucial characteristics of
the UCE marketplace. More realistically, further study of such
practical factors may be necessary before it is possible to come to
useful conclusions as to the magnitude of the role that existing,
revised, or new civil and criminal provisions can play in effectively
reducing spam.
CONCLUSION
The CAN-SPAM Act will almost certainly prove insufficient, by
itself, to thwart the explosion of spain. CAN-SPAM emerged during
165. See, e.g., Robert Bruce Thompson, DAYNOTES JOURNAL (Aug. 28, 2003), at
http://www.ttgnet.com/daynotes/2003/2003-35.html (asserting that "[t]he overwhelming
majority of spam messages are produced by just a few major spammers. I've seen various
estimates, but certainly the top 200 spammers are responsible for at least 80% and probably 95%
of the spain generated world-wide," but suggesting the effective response to this fact would
consist not so much of a litigation-based campaign against these spam kingpins, but rather
would involve a program of selective assassinations of exemplary identified spammers:
"Imagine the effect if tomorrow morning CNN reported that a major spammer had been found
shot to death, with a 'No Spam' postcard pinned to his chest.").
SPAM AFTER CAN-SPAM
an era in which industry observers and policy makers have viewed the
UCE problem in markedly different ways by employing divergent
analytical frameworks regarding the nature of e-mail and UCE, and
have accordingly proposed an array of diverse, not-wholly-consistent,
solutions influenced by these differing analytical approaches. None
of these solutions appears free from shortcomings, just as CAN-
SPAM will likely be hobbled in part by flawed, naive, or politically-
influenced analyses or curative approaches embraced during the start-
and-stop process that finally yielded the Act as the unimpressive
product of years of legislative dithering.
A successful hybrid approach to combating spam will likely
involve significant embrace of the economic and technological
analyses of spam, to identify and address the imbalances or
inefficiencies in the e-mail market that make spam feasible and
lucrative, and to provide technological defenses based on the
assumption that there will always remain an economic incentive for
some persons to abuse Internet-based communications. Development
of effective economic- and technology-based spare remedies will
depend in part on understanding more than we currently know about
the exact nature, extent, motivations for, and source of spam, and
about specific methods that have, or have not, yielded tangible
success in neutralizing it.
The need for economic and technical measures against spare
does not imply that law-based analyses and remedies cannot play an
important and effective role against UCE. CAN-SPAM was neither
the first, nor should it be the last, weapon in the legal arsenal against
UCE abuse. It may yet play a demonstrably-useful role, in
conjunction with pre-existing common law and statutory doctrines, in
making spammers pay financially and penally, and thus in reducing
the so-far accurate perception that spanming truly has no incremental
cost, fiscal or otherwise, for its perpetrators. In this connection,
Congress should likely consider amendments to CAN-SPAM,
whether to remove the strict pre-emption provision 166 that limits state
attempts to address spam, or to impose more stringent remedies, such
as an opt-in approach or private rights of action, to increase consumer
options against spain and put spammers on the defensive. Effective
international cooperation in the legal war against spain will be
166. But see S. 877, supra note 1 at § 8(b)(1)-(2) (preserving from pre-emption certain
state anti-fraud and consumer protection legislation, even as applied to e-mail); see also supra
note 61 (discussing the possibility that state laws falling within Act's non-preempted safe harbor
may continue to play a role in fighting spam).
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important, 167 and should not be unattainable, given that national
governments are among those on whom spammers currently impose
their economic externalities.
Taking on the world's UCE bandits will not be an easy task, and
will require clearer thinking, better coordination, and more
resoluteness of purpose, than manifest themselves in the history and
application to date of CAN-SPAM and other United States legal
approaches to spam control.
167. See, e.g., Gilbert Le Gras, Canada Eyes World Treaty to Deal with Spammers,
REUTERS (May 11, 2004), at http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml (noting proposals by
Canadian head of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development working party on
information security and privacy for international treaty, and perhaps extradition provisions for
suspected sparn kingpins, to address perceived shortcomings in existing national anti-sparn
laws).
